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British political parties and national policy toward European union in the Council of Europe, 1949-1952

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BRITISH POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD EUROPEAN UNION IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 1949-1952

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PERFIDE ALBION

Strasbourg, August, 1949

For over fifteen hundred years history has now and again focused its spotlight upon Strasbourg. This beautiful Alsatian city, situated at the junction of the Ill and Bruche rivers with the Rhine, is one of the show places of Europe.

The Romans built a forum on an island formed by the two branches of the Ill, and there, in 430 AD, King Clovis built a sanctuary. On this site in 1250 prosperous merchants raised the medieval Gothic Cathedral of Strasbourg. Through the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries many ornate Baroque structures appeared among the medieval buildings of the town. The Palais Universitaire founded in 1567 and, from 1730, the Town Hall (formally the Hotel de Hanau, and then, the Palace of Hesse-Darmstadt) faced each other across the Place de Broglie. These buildings and the four remaining towers of the town's medieval wall furnish subjects for many postcards and tourist brochures. They have lured visitors to the medieval Cathedral, the Baroque University buildings, quaint chalet-type houses and the internationally famous la Petite France with its excellent wines and succulent dishes for gourmand and gourmet alike.[1]

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1. "Strasbourg Today," The Illustrated London News, CCIV (August 27, 1949), 295-97.

It was in the Great Hall of Strasbourg University that the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe first met on August 10, 1949. The time seemed right. Voices of millions of free Europeans had been heard, and their representatives had come together at Strasbourg "to achieve a greater unity between . . . Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress."[2]

Indeed history again had its spotlight on Strasbourg, as it had about 1440 when Johann Gutenberg invented his printing press; and in 1681 when the French King Louis XIV employed the "Chambers of Reunion" to include Strasbourg in the expanding French nation-state; and in 1871 when Bismarckian policy severed Strasbourg and Alsace-Lorraine from France and attached it to the newly united German nation. In 1919 France, now victorious, redeemed the disgrace of 1871 and clutched Alsace-Lorraine and beautiful old Strasbourg once again to her nation-soul. Then in 1940 Hitler tore the much-disputed territory from France and fitted it into his Third Reich only to have the provinces and their now quite schizophrenic population returned to France after World War II. Each change has wrought consternation among the citizens of Alsatian Strasbourg.[3]

On August 10, 1949, one hundred and one parliamentarians

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2. Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, Chap. I, Art. 1, (a), International Organization, III (1949), 583.

3. Veit Valentin, The German People (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), 229, 481, 584.

from twelve European countries[4] met in the great colonnaded and tapestry-hung hall of Strasbourg University to work out a plan for greater political unity of Europeans. Strasbourg, which Maximilian I (1493-1519) had described as the bulwark of the Holy Roman Empire, might now become the bulwark of European unity.[5]

Serving as Provisional President at the first meeting of the Consultative Assembly, Edouard Herriot, President of the French National Assembly, called the meeting to order in the Palais Universitaire.[6] Herriot commanded the attention of the greatest men in contemporary Europe. There were foreign ministers of twelve countries[7] and representatives of every major political party in Western Europe except the Communists. The Assembly roster was studded with well-known names: Robert Schuman, Léon Blum, André Philip, René Pleven, Paul-Henri Spaak, Joseph Bech, Herbert Morrison, Ernest Bevin, Lord Layton, Count Sforza. Yet first among these men, dedicated to the common cause of European union at Strasbourg, was Winston Churchill.[8] After two destructive and demoralizing World Wars in a generation, and with mounting East-West tensions threatening a third more horrible con-

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4. "A Matter of Life and Death for Europe," The Illustrated London News, CCIV (August 20, 1949), 256.

5. "Strasbourg Today," op. cit., 296.

6. Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly (1st session), Agendas; Minutes (Strasbourg: 1949), p. 3.

7. These twelve nations were: Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
Francis Noel-Baker and Louis Dolivet, "Eye Witness Report from Strasbourg," United Nations World, III (October, 1949), 24.

8. "A Matter of Life and Death for Europe," op. cit., 257.

flict, all Europe and a great part of the free world viewed the Council of Europe as a positive step towards a European union and the gradual fulfilment of an ancient European dream.[9]

History of the Idea of European Union[10]

The idea of a United Europe is not new. In whose fertile brain and in what circumstances the idea of union in Europe was first conceived cannot be known; man seems always to have dreamed great dreams.[11] "Dante

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9. "At least three main currents have converged into the present program of union. One was the consequences of two World Wars. Another, the influence and example of the United States. The third, the fear aroused by the machinations of the Russians and their Communist adherents outside the Soviet Union."
Saul K. Padover, "Europe's New Lease on Life," United Nations World, VI (December, 1952), 20.

10. "The terms integration, union, and unification are a development of the idea of cooperation and simply mean a joining for one purpose or several."
Jane Perry Clark Carey, "Western European Union and the Atlantic Community," Foreign Policy Reports, XXVI (June 15, 1950), 67. [Italics in original.]

The term unity is also used in this paper in this same general way. In view of the fact that in all of the writing as well as the speeches both in the House of Commons and the Consultative Assembly these terms are used interchangeably, they are so used in this paper.

11. Hans Kohn writes: "Pan Europeanism as an idea may be traced back to mediaeval Christianity."
"Pan Movements", Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, XI (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1933), 552.

Joseph R. Strayer claims that the first European union was the respublica christiana, or Christian Commonwealth, at the end of the eleventh century in which Pope Urban II called the First Crusade, 1095. Here, he says, was a Christian Union with an army.
"The First Western Union", The Virginia Quarterly Review, XXVII (Spring, 1951), 198-205.

had the vision. Since the breakdown of the universal empire and the coming of frequent wars between the new national states, the idea has fascinated many distinguished men."[12] As early as 1305 Pierre Dubois, in a pamphlet entitled De Recuperatione Terrae Sanctae, called upon European Princes to unite and defend Christianity from the threatening Turks.[13] Winston Churchill, speaking at The Hague, May 7, 1948, accredited the French King Henry IV's great Minister, the Duke de Sully, as the first to sponsor European union. Between the years 1600 to 1607 he had labored on Le Grand Dessein to set up a permanent committee of fifteen European States. "This body was to act as an arbitrator on all questions concerning religious conflict, national frontiers, internal disturbance and common action against any danger from the east--which in those days meant the Turks."[14] In the eighteenth century the Abbé de Saint Pierre proposed a project for a permanent international arbitration system to another French King, Louis XV.[15] But the long and shameful reign of Louis XV (1715-1774) brought not the fruition of ideals or dreams, but rather poverty, pestilence and the French Revolution. Nor was the project of the Abbé de Saint Pierre for Perpetual Peace more kindly received when the philosopher Rousseau revived and

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12. Sidney B. Fay, "Union for Western Europe?", Current History, XVI (March, 1949), 156.

13. John Coatsworth, "European Integration," International Conciliation, No. 488 (February, 1953), 53.

14. Winston Churchill, "The Voice of Europe," Vital Speeches of the Day, XIX (May 15, 1948), 450.

15. René Courtin, "French Views on European Union," International Affairs, XXV (January, 1949), 8.

developed it. Nor was there any solace for a Europe in the throes of French revolutionary wars, when Germany's greatest philosopher, Immanuel Kant, contributed his ideas for a kind of union for Eternal Peace.[16] These were dreams indeed--the dreams of philosophers, idealists, statesmen and visionaries who abhorred the human suffering of internecine wars and saw in a united Europe either an end to chaos or a means to greatly coveted power. The nineteenth century, that period of expanding nation-state and empire, with the fulfillment of its "manifest destinies" and its credo of chauvinism, did not afford the climate or environment in which dreams of union, security and peace might be realized.

What men could not achieve through common consent, a few sought to gain by force. What Napoleon had failed to achieve with French bayonets and the lives of thousands of Europeans in the first part of the nineteenth century, Kaiser Frederick Wilhelm II with German cannon and more thousands of lives tried in the twentieth. Both these attempts came to grief because Great Britain could not afford to allow any nation in Europe to achieve hegemony on the Continent.[17]

After the great twentieth-century clash of the nation-states in Europe the Austrian Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi suggested his idea of Pan-European Union in 1922. He proposed a system of alliances among European states providing for compulsory arbitration of disputes, a Zollverein to improve Europe's chances for successful economic competition with the United States, and eventually the establishment of a

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16. Fay, op. cit., 156.

17. Frederick L. Schuman, "The Disunion of Europe," Current History, XXI (October, 1951), 204.

United States of Europe. Coudenhove-Kalergi's plan gained recognition and support in some European countries because he emphasized the need for Europe to unite against the Soviet Union.[18] "But this was a private initiative, and the majority of outstanding European statesmen paid little attention to his congresses and manifestoes."[19] Coudenhove-Kalergi, now (1955) a professor at New York University, continues to write and speak in Europe and America for a United Europe.

"Edouard Herriot was the first foreign minister in office to recommend the creation of the United States of Europe, in a speech in the Chamber of Deputies on 25 January 1925."[20] In September 1929 the idea of Pan Europe received semi-official sanction when French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, speaking in the League of Nations, proposed a European Federal Union. At the request of the League, Briand circulated his proposal for the creation of a European Federal Union in May 1930. The memorandum was sent to twenty-seven European states, including Russia.

> Briand's original plan envisaged the creation of a European Federal Union with broad powers, outside the framework of the League of Nations. Its purpose was threefold: 1, it was to establish France's political and economic hegemony on the Continent; 2, its edge was to be directed against the Soviet Union; and 3, it was to protect Europe from the political and economic influence of the United States of America.[21]

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18. Hans Kohn, op. cit., 552.

19. Alexander Galin, "Europe: Split or United?", Foreign Affairs, XXV (April, 1947), 408.

20. Goormaghtigh, op. cit., 54. [Italics added.]

21. Galin, op. cit., 409-10.

Briand's "European Association" was primarily an outline of a legal structure setting up a system of arbitration in political and economic areas and "any infringement upon national sovereignty was definitely excluded."[22] Although the European Commission of Inquiry for European Union, formed in 1930 through Briand's efforts, ceased to function after 1932,[23] Briand's proposal was most important in the history of the idea of European union because this was the first time that the question of unity was officially raised by the responsible spokesmen of a major European government.[24]

So after another one hundred and fifty years the fruit of unity was still green and European political union was still a dream of intellectuals, idealists and visionaries. Adolph Hitler, the mesmerist and mystic, came nearer than his martial predecessors to establishing his "New Order" of German hegemony and unity on the European continent. This "'racial' empire of lunacy and extermination"[25] collapsed with the Allied victory at the end of World War II in 1945. Thus again, Europe was saved from the uniters.[26]

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22. Robert Schuman, "France and Europe," Foreign Affairs, XXXI (April, 1953), 349.

23. Galin, op. cit., 411.

24. Robert Schuman, op. cit., 349.

25. Frederick Schuman, op. cit., 204.

26. This brief resumé does not include all the proposals for European union. Among those not mentioned was William Penn's plan of 1693 for a type of league of nations which contained provisions for compulsory arbitration. Philip S. Belasco, "William Penn," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, XII (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1933), 64-65.

As Paul-Henri Spaak has indicated, the idea of European union lay dormant from 1945 to 1947. Those who saw in union a panacea for European ills had despaired of ever achieving their dream. The Communist coup d'etat in Prague in February 1948 gave a new impetus to the idea of union. This event, plus the continued worsening of the Cold War, convinced many that only by the creation of a United Europe could the West repel the encroachment of Communism.[27]

Frederick L. Schuman, Professor of Political Science at Williams College, summed up centuries of history when he wrote:

> A free and voluntary federation of the European nation-states has been talked about for centuries, but has never yet been realized in any workable fashion. The present "Council of Europe" is the closest approach to such union, but the gap between aspiration and reality is by no means bridged.
>
> Union by the sword of a conqueror has long remained a hypothetical alternative.... But all such ventures have been shipwrecked in the end by the politics of the "balance-of-power" and broken on the rocks of nationalistic resistance to every attempt to establish a single European imperium.[28]

William G. Carleton claims that "in the larger sense the Council of Europe and its most conspicuous agency, the Strasbourg Assembly, reach back through the ages and are connected historically with the Concert of Europe, the Napoleonic Confederation, the Holy Roman Empire, the medieval concept of a united Christendom, and the Roman imperium." "What of the Council of Europe?", The Virginia Quarterly Review, XXVII (Spring, 1951) 180.

Frederick L. Schuman summarily dismisses these pseudo-unions from serious consideration in discussing the background of history which was to be the germ of union which grew into the Council of Europe at Strasbourg in 1949. Op. cit., 202-207.

27. Paul-Henri Spaak, "England Tiptoes into Europe," United Nations World, VII (April, 1953), 17.

28. Op. cit., 203.

How then did the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe happen to convene at Strasbourg in August 1949? According to Frederick Schuman, the Strasbourg meeting was the result of three factors which "combined to produce a new market for an old proposal": (1) World War II, (2) the threat from expanding Communism, and (3) the support of the United States.[29]

The Problem--Perfide Albion

The struggles and conflicts in the many sittings of the Council of Europe were to reveal that a great deal must be accomplished before "the gap between aspiration and reality" could be bridged. Among those who worked so hard to bring the Council of Europe into existence, the cause of failure to create some type of viable European union or federation has been attributed to the negative attitude and to the "obstructionism" of the British Government. Prior to the British general elections in October 1951, the British Labour Government received the odium of unionists in the free world for its refusal to lead in the furtherance of what was considered a necessary step in the struggle for the survival of European civilization against Russian Communism. Not only, said the Labour Government's critics (among them, Churchill and unionists within the Labour Party itself), did the British Government refuse leadership in this cause, but it obstructed the cause of union in the Council of Europe after that body had been so arduously established.

In 1951 Edouard Bonnefous, President of the Foreign Affairs

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29. "The Council of Europe," The American Political Science Review, XLV (September, 1951), 725.

Commission of the French National Assembly, was reported as saying "European unity is dead, and the European Assembly at Strasbourg is dead, too, and it is the British who killed them."[30] Paul-Henri Spaak, the first President of the Consultative Assembly, resigned on December 11, 1951, so that he might be in a position to voice his opinion on the struggles and conflicts in the Assembly.[31] Discussing the inability of the Council of Europe to work, Spaak said: "Mr. Bevin's responsibility for this state of affairs was considerable. Though it is impossible to explain why, it is nevertheless apparent that he had neither confidence in, nor sympathy for, the European Council."[32] In a speech delivered at a dinner given by the American Committee on United Europe in New York in 1951, Spaak laid full responsibility for the crisis evolving in the Council of Europe upon the attitude of the British Government.

> To tell you the whole truth, the second session of the Assembly which was held in August 1950 started in a real atmosphere of crisis, the basic cause of which lies in Great Britain's attitude towards Europe.
>
> Today, it appears clearly that Great Britain refuses to commit herself thoroughly in the constitution of a new Europe...[33]

Francis Noel-Baker, Conservative MP, thought Ernest Bevin's opposition

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30. New York Times, July 30, 1951, p. 5.

31. Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly (3d session), Official Report of Debates Part I (Strasbourg: 1951), IV, 1091-92.

32. Op. cit., 18.

33. "The European Tragedy," Vital Speeches of the Day, XVII (March 15, 1951), 325.

to European union stemmed from "the fact that the structual concept of the Council of Europe took shape under the guidance of Winston Churchill."[34] Giving reasons for the ineffectiveness of the Council of Europe, Robert Boothby, Conservative MP, noted:

> The Council of Europe is in danger of being sunk by the apathy of public opinion and by the apparent indifference of too many of the governments which established it, amounting in the case of the British Government to an almost unveiled hostility.[35]

Thus in 1950 and 1951, distinguished observers attributed the ineffectiveness, if not outright failure, of the Council of Europe to policies of the British Labour Government.

Meanwhile, particularly because of the initiative and prestige of Winston Churchill, adherents of European union hailed the British Conservative Party as the champion and leader of the idea of European unity. When the Consultative Assembly convened at Strasbourg on August 10, 1949, Provisional President Herriot singled out Churchill from all those assembled in the Great Hall of Strasbourg University:

> You have present among you, dear Colleagues, the very best example of that richness of the soul which reconciles, rather than opposes; and for that reason, you will allow me to offer our common homage to one whom every free man owes so deep a debt—my illustrious friend, Mr. Winston Churchill, who has shown us to what heights human energy is capable of attaining. For in many moments of deep tragedy he bore upon his shoulders the whole weight of the world crying out for help. From his mind sprang the movement which has brought us together here.[36]

Winston Churchill's Conservative Government acceded to power

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34. Op. cit., 24.

35. "The Future of the Council of Europe," International Affairs, XXVIII (July, 1952), 332.

36. Agendas; Minutes (1st session), p. 4.

in October 1951. Champions of European union, rightly or wrongly, expected their sorely battered cause to receive new impetus from a British Government whose leader had promoted union. But British policy towards union did not change. Observers now spoke of "betrayal" and many laid this "betrayal" at the feet of Churchill himself. It came to be felt that Conservative policy did as much to damage the cause of European union as the "obstructionism" of the British Labour Government had done. R. H. S. Crossman, Labour, MP, lamenting the deplorable state of Franco-British relations, undoubtedly reflected the attitude of many towards Churchill when he wrote:

> But Mr. Churchill is very much mistaken if he believes that his own speeches have done anything to improve [Anglo-French relations]. To talk grandiosely of Conservative support for European Union . . .and then to reveal an opposition as insular as Mr. Bevan's merely confirms the feeling that all English politicians underrate the intelligence of the French.[37]

Once again, the ancient cry, Perfide Albion[38] was heard. This insult has been flung in the teeth of the English throughout their long history of balance-of-power politics. To maintain a balance in Europe, Britain has sought for centuries to keep her potential enemies divided amongst themselves. The second strongest power in Europe allied with her against the strongest. "Committed to a role to which her physical resources were not equal"[39] her policy had always been designed to

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37. "A French Diary," The New Statesman and Nation, XL (September 16, 1950), 272.

38. Sir Alfred Zimmerman, "How Can Europe Unite?", Vital Speeches of the Day, XVII (September 1, 1951), 678.

39. Ibid.

keep Europe divided and so prevent any one continental power from achieving hegemony in Europe. So now "betrayed" by Churchill, whom many had regarded as the architect, instigator, and champion of the United States of Europe, disillusioned advocates of European union spat out their disapprobation in this ancient taunt.

It will be pointed out that regardless of the disappointment among unionists with British policy, their criticism of Britain was to a large extent unjustified. Many felt a European union would require British participation to be effective. To the extent that sacrifice of sovereignty would be involved, such participation was contrary to British interest as the center of the Commonwealth of Nations and the sterling bloc. To expect a Conservative Government to participate in union was also unrealistic. In no sense had Labour foreign policy differed in essentials from Conservative foreign policy. There was simply a British foreign policy, and as long as participation in union was not essential to British interests there would be no great effort by the British Government--whether Labour or Conservative--to bring such a union into existence.

It is the purpose of this study to trace the attitudes of the Labour and Conservative Parties towards the question of European union as these attitudes were reflected in the policies of the British Government towards events which culminated in the Council of Europe. The attitudes of both Parties as reflected in British policies in the Council of Europe have been examined in an effort to distinguish what might be called "true" British policy toward European union from what it was anticipated that British policy would be when the Conservative

Party came back into power. This differential is especially pertinent if the failure of the Conservative Party to change British policy with regard to European union is to be understood. Since the prime mover of the European union idea was Winston Churchill,[40] the key to the problem may be found in differentiating Churchill's plan of union and Britain's role in such a union from what the great masses of unionists thought Churchill's plan to be.

The factors which shaped British policy towards European union under both Labour and Conservative Governments were of great importance. Some of these factors will only become known in the light of history; other immediately apparent factors affecting British policy toward European union have been examined. These include the effect of the Cold War as an impetus to European union; the British fear that involvement in Continental affairs would sacrifice freedom of action in the rest of the world and especially in the Commonwealth of Nations; the insularity of the Labour Government, faced as it was with recurrent domestic crises and the felt need to protect the Socialistic experiment from both Continental radicalism and extreme laissez-faire; and the obstructing force of nationalism.

Lastly, it would be impossible to undertake such a study without endeavoring to estimate the effect which British policies have had, and will continue to have, on the course of European union. Are those

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40. This is evidenced by unanimous consent of all authorities on the subject. There is hardly an article on the subject which does not attribute to Churchill the credit of instigating and leading the movement of European union which resulted in the establishment of the Council of Europe.

who have been disappointed by English refusal to enter a European union once again justified in hurling the excruciating taunt, Perfide Albion, at the British for destroying Europe's latest opportunity for achieving security and peace?

It seems pertinent first to examine the events which culminated in the Council of Europe, paying particular attention to the attitude of the Labour and Conservative Party leaders towards these events. The Conservative's Puck, Winston Churchill, had been forced to vacate 10 Downing Street with Labour's landslide victory in August 1945, when the "ungrateful" English turned their Winnie out to pasture. It might have been expected that a man of such Herculean energy would develop some new interest to enliven his forced retirement from power. An interest, since he was an astute politician, calculated to embarrass the Government of which he was the Leader of the Opposition, and one which needed a great prophet to further its cause.[41] The leader of the British wartime coalition government became the prophet and champion of European unison.[42]

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41. In an interesting article on Churchill's literary and oratorical style, Herbert Howarth pointed out that Churchill is very conscious of his prophetic role.

"He was never willing to leave the sermon or the trumpets behind. As the self-appointed prophet of world crises, he needed them. "He lived for crises--to prophesy them, participate in them, and write their annals. For the prophet every moment is a crisis; the world is always about to rise or fall."

Howarth also pointed out that Churchill has written an essay on Moses. "Behind Winston Churchill's Grand Style: Britain's Prophet of Doom and Defiance," Commentary, XI (June, 1951), 551-52.

42. "Churchill's active campaign for what he terms a United Europe came after the war leader left office in 1945." Grant S. Mc Clellan, "Britain and Western European Union," Foreign Policy Reports, XXIV (October 15, 1948), 123.

CHAPTER II

EVENTS LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

L'Enfant Terrible--Prophet and Champion

Provocative suggestions and organised movements had contemplated some European political union for many years prior to the formation of the Council of Europe in 1949. But the dramatic response of Winston Churchill to the turn of events in relations between Russia and western Europe in 1947 and 1948 appears to have crystallised wills and aspirations to give institutional form to the ancient and honorable idea of political union.

Count Coudenhove-Kalergi had been issuing manifestoes and calling unofficial Congresses since the founding of his Pan-European Union in 1923.[1] He cannot be accredited as the initiator of the idea of European union which manifested itself in the Council of Europe at Strasbourg in 1949. His was a private movement which had won the tacit approval of the heads of many European Governments. In 1947 Coudenhove-Kalergi reorganised his Pan-European Union and founded the European Parliamentary Union. This organisation held its fourth Parliamentary

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1. Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-European Union held four Congresses: Vienna, 1926, Berlin, 1929, Basel, 1932, and Vienna again in 1935. His Parliamentary Union, organised in 1947, had, up to 1954, held four Parliamentary Congresses: Ostend, 1947, Interlaken, 1948, Venice, 1949, and Constance, 1950. Who's Who, (London: The MacMillan Company, 1954), p. 637.

Congress in Constance in 1950, after the Council of Europe was a functioning organism.

General Jan Christiaan Smuts, speaking before the United Kingdom branch of the Empire Parliamentary Association in London on November 25, 1943, advocated a British-Western European union to fill the power vacuum which would result with the defeat of Germany.[2] His proposal was for the erection of a western bloc "as the only means by which Britain might continue to rank as a great power."[3] Smuts' proposal was received with dissatisfaction by the Allies for two reasons. He referred to the fall of French power, and his western bloc implied fear of Russia.[4] In 1943 although physically and morally weak after three years of German occupation, France was still an ally; so was Russia. While allies were engaged in the life and death struggle against Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy was no time for the advocacy of a Western bloc heresy. Smuts' proposal was premature, and he cannot be said to have been the precursor of the European union idea which resulted in the Council of Europe.

Towards the end of 1944, General Franco, "foreseeing the defeat of his allies and patrons, Hitler and Mussolini, wrote a letter to Winston Churchill in which he stressed the necessity of uniting Europe against the Soviet Union."[5] Franco, like Coudenhove-Kalergi

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2. New York Times, December 3, 1943, pp. 1, 8.

3. Grant S. McClellan, "Britain's Search for Security," Foreign Policy Reports, XXI (March 15, 1945), 7.

4. Ibid.

5. Galin, op. cit., 412.

and Smuts, cannot rightly be regarded as the champion of the European union idea which grew and flourished as the East-West split became more and more pronounced. Their proposals did, however, have one point in common—they were all directed against the Soviet Union.

Smuts' concept of a "Third Force" was taken up and sponsored by a large segment of the Left-wing of the Labour Party in 1946 and 1947 under the leadership of R. H. S. Crossman. This faction felt that a "Third Force" in Europe offered an alternative to the Attlee-Bevin line of "all-out" cooperation with, if not dependence upon, American policy.[6] However, the "Third Force" concept of the Crossman faction was not, like Smuts' concept of a western bloc, directed against Russia.[7] But even the Crossman faction, as was so amply indicated in The New Statesman and Nation, realized that the opportunity for this "middle course" was lost to Britain when Russia and her satellites walked out of the Paris talks on the proposed Marshall Aid in July 1947. This act ended the illusion of four-power cooperation and irrevocably split the world into two camps.[8] "The refusal of the Soviet Union," said James Godfrey,

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6. James L. Godfrey, "British Foreign Policy and the Labour Party, 1945-47," The South Atlantic Quarterly, XL (April, 1948), 142-43.

7. It might be imperative to point out that while many who favored a European union did not recognize it at the time, this was essentially Winston Churchill's position in regard to European union. Despite the multifarious ambiguities resulting either from the rhetorical excesses or the political astuteness of Winston Churchill, a perusal of his many speeches on the subject of European union reveals that he regarded union as Smuts did—i.e., a Western bloc as a threat to Russia and a deterrent to the United States.

8. "Socialist and Western Union," The New Statesman and Nation, XXXV (February 21, 1948), 147.
This is but one article of dozens which appeared in the columns

"to participate in the preparation of the European Recovery Plan at Paris gave the coup de grace to the dreams of those who insisted upon co-operation with the Communists without first learning whether or not the Communists would co-operate."[9] This Russian action made the Crossman position untenable. Although The New Statesman and Nation, given the least occasion, still favored a middle course for Britain, it grieved more because the Attlee-Bevin dependence on America had lost Britain her chance of independence of action in the struggle between the eastern and western Leviathans.

Whatever the motives or inspiration and whatever form Western union might take in the course of time and events, the history of the European union idea which culminated in the Council of Europe names Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill as the prime mover and champion of that unity.[10] Fulton, Zurich and The Hague constituted the three great

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of this weekly from the beginning of 1948 through 1950 which critized the Labour Government for its failure to take advantage of the opportunities since 1945 for a "middle of the road policy" for Great Britain between the United States and Soviet Russia.

9. Op. cit., 151.

10. See Chapter I, page 13, for Edouard Herriot's homage to Churchill as leader of European union.

In referring to the Council of Europe, Harold Macmillan, Conservative MP, wrote: "Of course, it is to Churchill, more than any other man, that this extraordinary result is due."
"Verdict on Strasbourg," The Spectator (London), CLXXXIII (September 16, 1949), 345.

Arthur N. Holcombe, Professor at Harvard University, wrote: "Among Europeans the foremost advocate of European Union since World War II is generally considred to have been Winston Churchill."
"An American View of European Union," The American Political

steps Churchill took in his leadership of Western Europe towards the goal of a United Europe.

As has already been noticed, Frederick Schuman pointed out that three new factors—World War II, fear of Soviet Communist expansion, and the favor with which the idea of union was greeted in the United States—contributed to the "politically effective support" the European union idea received in the period just prior to the Strasbourg experiment.[11] The favor with which the idea of union was greeted in the United States was a direct result of the fear of Soviet Communist expansion. It was fear—fear of the expansion of Communist Russia—which gave primary impetus to the European union idea. It was this fear and the acceptance of the inevitability of the East-West split even before it became a fait accompli—as early as 1945[12]—which led Churchill to deliver his address at Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946. Fear and

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Science Review, XLVII (June, 1953), 420.

John Freeman wrote: "The idea of European Union, of which the Council of Europe is the expression, gained widespread acceptance, at least on the Continent, largely as the result of Winston Churchill's rhetoric when out of office." "Outlook from Strasbourg, Part I," The New Statesman and Nation, XLII (December 8, 1951), 659.

11. The American Political Science Review, XLV (September, 1951), 725.

12. In a letter to Joseph Stalin of April 29, 1945, which he made public in a debate on foreign affairs in the House of Commons on December 10, 1948, Churchill pointed out the danger of Russian policy in splitting One World into Two:
"There is not much comfort in looking into a future where you and the countries you dominate, plus the Communist parties in many other states, are all drawn up on one side and those who rallied to the English-speaking nations and their associates or dominions are on the other.... Their quarrel would tear the world to pieces."
"Letter to Josef," Newsweek, XXXII (December 20, 1948), 31.

the advanced recognition of the dichotomy between East and West led Winston Churchill to call for an alliance of the English-speaking people of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States.

> Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States.[13]

President Truman, who had journeyed to Westminster College at Fulton to introduce the English Olympian doubtless was chagrined when Churchill uttered the following comments on the Russian menace:

> A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytising tendencies....
>
> From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.[14]

This he said, and more, to the embarrassment of Governments still committed to the policy of endeavoring to resolve the differences which had developed between their Governments and the Soviet Union since the late war.

It is impossible to know to what extent Churchill envisioned a United States of Europe, when in the Fulton address he said:

> The safety of the world, ladies and gentlemen, requires a new unity in Europe from which no nation should be permanently outcast.[15]

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13. Winston Churchill, "Alliance of English-Speaking People," Vital Speeches of the Day, XII (March 15, 1946), 331.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

Was this the nucleus of the United States of Europe he was to call for six months later in another of his provocative speeches at Zurich University in Switzerland?

Churchill had made it clear that he had "no official mission or status of any kind"[16] when he spoke at Fulton. Attlee and Bevin did not disavow the Churchillian pronouncements even when Left-wing Labour members demanded that they do so.[17] While at the time the Fulton speech was embarrassing to Washington and London, it later became the first step in the reorientation of British policy which culminated in the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance.

The Fulton speech was of great importance, not only because of the vague appeal embodied in it for "a new type of unity in Europe" which could be anything, but also because it pointed out, although unofficially, the direction which the Attlee-Bevin foreign policy was to take. Yet more important, as one British observer has indicated, "the unity of continental Western Europe has been by implication a major objective of Western policy since Mr. Churchill's Fulton speech."[18] Another noted that "the Fulton speech . . . came as a great shock, and though it was widely approved it was also widely criticised, both here and in the United States."[19] At Fulton Churchill "made a prognosis of

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16. Ibid., 329.

17. Godfrey, op. cit., 145-46.

18. John Freeman, "Outlook from Strasbourg, Part II," The New Statesman and Nation, XLII (December 15, 1951), 698.

19. Cyril Falls, "From Fulton to Boston," The Illustrated London News, CCXIV (April 16, 1949), 510.

international affairs which the world was hardly yet prepared to recognise as sound, but which has since proved to be so."[20]

In spite of taunts of warmongering received from both sides of the Atlantic and the flush of embarrassment the mention of his prophecies produced in diplomatic circles in both London and Washington, the western Cassandra let go another blast of Churchillian oratory at Zurich University in Switzerland on September 19, 1946, six months after the Fulton address. Seldom, if ever, had Churchill so effectively employed his eighteenth century pastiche[21] as at Zurich when he called for a United States of Europe based upon a Franco-German alliance. After the expected amenities and a few English wittieisms he began: "I wish to speak to you today about the tragedy of Europe;" and ended with the exclamation: "Let Europe arise!" Churchill awakened a new hope in the hearts of thousands of Europeans, who saw in European union a panacea for all Europe's ills.

His plea for union was not the vague pronouncement of Fulton that "the safety of the world . . . requires a new unity in Europe...." The Zurich speech was clarion and unequivocal in its call for a United Europe:

> If Europe were once united in the sharing of its common inheritance there would be no limit to the happiness, the prosperity and the glory which its 300,000,000 or 400,000,000 people would enjoy.[22]

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20. Ibid.

21. Churchill, himself, is reported to have said of his style of speaking and writing, "I affected a combination of the styles of Macaulay and Gibbon . . . and I stuck in a bit of my own from time to time." Howarth, op. cit., 550.

22. "A United States of Europe," Vital Speeches of the Day, XII (October 1, 1946), 741.

Churchill invoked a picture of the Dark Ages to impress his hearers with the gravity of the threat which menaced Western civilisation. Then he stated a "sovereign remedy":

> It is to recreate the European family, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe. In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living.[23]

Even Paul-Henri Spaak, eventually one of Churchill's severest critics, conceded that "at Zurich Churchill did not advocate a United Europe of which Great Britain would become an integral part."[24] This was important because it was something most of his critics had conveniently "disremembered" by October 1951. In advocating the value of regional organizations in maintaining world peace and security Churchill clearly implied what Great Britain's position would be with regard to a united Europe:

> There is no reason why a regional organization of Europe should in any way conflict with the world organization of the United Nations.
>
> On the contrary, I believe that the larger synthesis will only survive if it is founded upon broad natural groupings in the Western Hemisphere. We British have our own Commonwealth of nations. These do not weaken--on the contrary they strengthen--the world organization. They are, in fact, its main support. And why should there not be a European grouping which can give a sense of national patriotism and common citizenship to the distracted peoples of this turbulent and mighty Continent, and why should it not take its proper place, with other great groupings and help to shape the destinies of man?[25]

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23. Ibid.

24. Spaak, United Nations World, VII (April, 1953), 17. [Italics in original.]

25. Churchill, Vital Speeches, XII (October 1, 1946), 741.

It was unmistakably clear that Churchill did not see Britain as the Commonwealth of Nations merged with his newly proposed United States of Europe. Rather he envisaged the British Empire and Commonwealth, the United States and associates, and his newly proposed edifice, the United States of Europe, as the three great regional structures bolstering the United Nations organization.

But how was this United States of Europe to be created? Here, too, Churchill thought he had furnished the basis for such a union when he proposed a Franco-German rapprochement:

> I am now going to say something which will astonish you. The first step in the re-creation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany.
>
> In this way only can France recover the moral and cultural leadership of Europe.
>
> There can be no revival of Europe without a spiritually great France and a spiritually great Germany.[26]

Of the structure of such a United Europe, Churchill had little to say; he offered no formula or concrete proposals. Indeed, he never would; but such was hardly the work of a prophet. He did say, as he would again in other speeches: "I shall not try to make a detailed program for hundreds of millions of people who want to be happy, free and prosperous."[27] Speaking of the Franco-German accord, the *sine qua non* of any European union, he did hint that some concessions of sovereignty might be involved. "The structure," Churchill stated, "of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the

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26. *Ibid.*, 742.

27. *Ibid.*

material strength of a single state less important."[28] Then, committing himself yet a bit more, he continued: "If at first all states of Europe /Did he consider the United Kingdom as a state of Europe?/ are not willing or able to join the union, we must nevertheless proceed to assemble and combine those who will and can."[29] By implication Soviet Russia and her satellites were to be excluded. A United States of Europe would be the basis for splitting Europe in half as the world was split in half.[30] Yet in conclusion Churchill still held out some hope of Russian cooperation in this grand plan of union. In the circumstances his statement could have been nothing but a sop to world opinion:

> In all this urgent work, France and Germany must take the lead together. Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America and, I trust, Soviet Russia--and then indeed all would be well--must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe. Let Europe arise![31]

"This hysterical and panicky speech evoked both ardent approval and ardent protest."[32] Again the Labour Government was annoyed by the leader of His Majesty's Loyal Opposition. The British Foreign Office

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28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Referring to the Zurich speech, Alexander Galin wrote: "Bearing in mind that in European Russia there are eight Soviet Republics with a total population of 130,000,000, that the countries bordering on the countries bordering on the Soviet Union--which are also to be left out of the United States of Europe--have a population of not less than 90,000,000, it will be seen that Mr. Churchill is proposing to unite half the population of Europe and to set it against the other half."

31. Churchill, Vital Speeches, XII (October 1, 1946), 742.

32. Galin, op. cit., 412.

was quick to announce "that the Government was in no way consulted or informed about the speech made in Zurich by Mr. Winston Churchill."[33]

According to Frederick Schuman, Churchill's Zurich speech "proposed . . . a Continental regional group within the U. N., with Britain, America, and Russia outside as 'friends and sponsors of the new Europe.'"[34] On the other hand, Galin, writing in Foreign Affairs in April, 1947, believed that Churchill's United States of Europe was directed, not only against the Soviet Union, but, against the United States as well. "One of its purposes," Galin stated, "is to fence off a part of Europe from the political influence and economic competition of the United States and to create the most favorable conditions for British economic and political leadership in this part of Europe."[35] If this was so, and such was the tenor of Churchill's Zurich speech, Churchill's position was very close to that segment of the Labour Party which, under R. H. S. Crossman's leadership, advocated the creation of a "Third Force" in Europe. The major exception was that while Churchill advocated a close alliance with America--the Fulton speech was ample evidence--and favored European union as a bloc against Russia, the Crossman faction favored a disavowal of the Fulton premise by their leaders, Attlee and Bevin, and a more independent policy in foreign affairs for Great Britain.[36] Another indication of the rapport which

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33. Ibid., 416, citing The Daily Herald of September 21, 1946.

34. The American Political Science Review, XLV (September, 1951), 726.

35. Op. cit., 414.

36. Geoffrey, op. cit., 137-151.

existed between Churchill and the Left-wing faction of Labour, which supported European union, was its acquiescence to the Churchill-sponsored proposals for European unity in the House of Commons and at The Hague in May, 1948. There was no doubt a great divergence of aims between Churchill and those Socialists who favored a European union under British sponsorship. But these differences were smothered by Attlee-Bevin opposition to any type of union--as the Left-wing understood it--and especially to any union under the aegis of Churchill. Many of Labour's back-benchers came to regard British sponsorship of and cooperation in some form of union as a possible alternative to dependence upon the United States, especially in the field of foreign policy where so many Left-wing Labourites felt American policy was detrimental to British interests. The Crossman faction, which had deplored the Attlee-Bevin alignment with the United States, were joined by those Labourites who felt that close cooperation in Europe, perhaps the "third force" might offer Britain more independence in foreign affairs. This split in the Labour Party on foreign policy was to be a constant irritation to Prime Minister Clement Attlee and his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin. Churchill's two world-shaking pronouncements served to abet the divisions and confusion in Labour's ranks.[37]

These two speeches, the Fulton speech to a lesser extent than the Zurich speech, gave new impetus to the movement for European unity.

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37. Ibid., Maurice Edelman, "Parliament: Platonic Union," The New Statesman and Nation, XXXV (January 31, 1948), 86; "Socialists and Western Union," The New Statesman and Nation, XXXV (February 21, 1948), 147; "Ourselves and America," The New Statesman and Nation, XL (December 16, 1950), 616.

As if overnight new organizations were created to give expression to this new demand for union.[38] Seven of these organizations were important because of their influential leadership. Their stated objectives were various and often divergent, but their general goal was to encourage and propagate European unity.

One of these organizations was Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-European Union which had been reorganized into the European Parliamentary Union in August 1947, under the presidency of Georges Bohy, chairman of the Socialists in the Belgian Parliament. The largest and probably most influential organization, the one which would succeed in convoking The Hague Conference for European Unity in May, 1948, was the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity. In December, 1947, this committee coordinated the efforts of five bodies: (1) The Economic League for European Cooperation founded in 1946 under the chairmanship of Paul van Zeeland of Belgium; (2) The European Union of Federalists founded in October, 1946, with Dr. H. Burgmans as chairman; (3) Les Nouvelles Equipes Internationales with Robert Bichet as chairman; (4) Le Conseil Français pour l'Europe Unie whose patron was Edouard Herriot, long known for his advocacy of European Union; and (5) The United Europe Committee formed in London in January, 1947 with Winston Churchill as its President. The Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe, under the chairmanship of M. Rasquin, made the

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38. "When Winston Churchill made his speech in Zurich in September 1946 there was so widespread and so spontaneous a response almost instantaneously new societies for propagating the idea of United Europe sprang into being: existing societies received a new breath of life." A. Loveday, "The European Movement," International Organization, III (November, 1949), 620.

seventh of these organisations.[39] "These affiliated bodies advocated policies which are far from identical. They . . . [were] united by two links: belief in democracy and belief in the need for promoting European Union."[40]

Despite the importance of Churchill's Fulton and Zurich addresses, it cannot be said that they were entirely responsible for the astonishing birth of these organisations. They did not spring from seeds sown by Churchill at Fulton and Zurich. As has been pointed out Coudenhove-Kalergi's European Parliamentary Union was the result of his earlier crusading and proselyting under the auspices of his Pan-European Movement founded in 1922-23. The continued deterioration of East-West relationships and the worsening of the Cold War were probably as instrumental as Fulton or Zurich in the rejuvenescence of European union. The failure of the Big Four to agree on peace treaties for Germany and Austria in March, 1947, the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine in March of the same year, the Russian refusal to take part in the Paris conferences on Marshall Aid in July 1947, and the Russian announcement of the formation of the Cominform in October 1947 aided in setting the stage for renascent organisations dedicated to the ancient vision of European unity. Also, these were the events which were to impel the Labour Government of Great Britain reluctantly to take a series of steps which resulted in the founding of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg.

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39. Ibid., 621.
40. Ibid., 620.

Responsible Government--Hesitant Steps

It was natural that a Government which felt it had a common bond--basing its support on the laboring classes and dedicated, as it was, to "fair shares for all"--and a long history of Labour Party "friendship" with Russia should strive to maintain tranquil relations between Britain and Russia.[41] It was also natural that such a Government should seek to mitigate the differences which arose between the great powers after the war, and that it should also resent the forces which were relentlessly poisoning the atmosphere of every conference, peace-treaty talk or meeting held between the Big-Four ministers or their representatives. Jealous for its Socialist experiment at home, faced with one domestic crisis after another[42] which tended to increase Britain's dependence on America, and impelled by circumstances to pursue policies in foreign affairs which accentuated her weakness at home and threatened to split the Labour Party, the Labour Government proceeded hesitantly, very hesitantly, in the direction of European union.

Regardless of what had been Labour's aspirations for a "middle course" for Britain, or the desire of many Labour members for "friendship" with Soviet Russia, Ernest Bevin's speech in the House of Commons on January 22, 1946, spelled the end to dreams for One World based on

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41. For a brief resume of Labour Party "friendship" with the Soviet Government see: Carl F. Brand, "British Labor and Soviet Russia," The South Atlantic Quarterly, XLVIII (July, 1949), 327-40.

42. There were three major crises upon which the Labour Government was to spend a good part of its energies between 1945 and 1950. They were: (1) The fuel crisis of February 1947, (2) the convertibility crises of August 1947, and (3) the devaluation of the pound in September 1949. "Osmosis in Queuetopia," Time, LV (February 6, 1950), 21.

harmonious working relationships among the victorious war Powers. This was the first actual step the Labour Government was to take towards union.

Bevin began his speech with a discussion of the discord between the East and West. He pointed out that "Britain had tried to consider every point of view," but that Russian expansion west of the Stettin, Trieste and Elbe line could not be allowed.[43] Then he went on to say:

> No one disputes the idea of European unity: That is not the issue. The issue is whether European unity cannot be achieved without the domination and control of one great power. That is the issue which has to be solved.[44]

He enunciated three basic principles of British foreign policy: (1) "No one nation should dominate Europe;" (2) Britain should discard the "old-fashioned conception of the balance of power;" and (3) in its place "there should be substituted Four-Power co-operation and assistance to all the States of Europe to enable them to evolve freely each in its own way."[45] Returning to the question of Western union, Bevin stated further:

> We did not press the Western Union--and I know that some of our neighbours were not desirous of pressing it--in the hope that when we got the German and Austrian peace settlements, agreement between the Four Powers would close the breach between East and West, and thus avoid the necessity of crystallising Europe into separate blocs. We have always wanted the widest conception of Europe, including, of course, Russia.[46]

Bevin then denied that Britain was engaged in forming a bloc against

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43. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CMLVI (1948), 383-87.

44. Ibid., 388.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., 390.

Russia, but reminded the Russians that Britain had the right to form alliances in the West when he said:

> Anything His Majesty's Government do now in this matter [of making security alliances] will not be directed against the Soviet Union or any other country, but we are entitled to organise the kindred souls of the West, just as they [the Russians] organise their kindred souls.[47]

Bevin stated that in refusing to take part in the European Recovery Program Russia decided

> to risk the Western Plan or Western Union--that is to say they risked the creation of a possible organism in the West. My further opinion is that they thought they could wreck or intimidate Western Europe by political upsets, economic chaos, and even revolutionary methods.[48]

Bevin left no doubt that any Western union or integration would be a slow, step-by-step process which would include economic and social, as well as political, factors:

> Now we have to face a new situation. In this it is impossible to move as quickly as we would wish. We are dealing with nations which are free to take their own decisions. It is easy enough to draw up a blueprint for a united Western Europe and to construct neat-looking plans on paper. While I do not wish to discourage the work done by voluntary political organisations in advocating ambitious schemes for European unity, I must say that it is a much slower and harder job to carry out a practical programme which takes into account the realities which face us, and I am afraid that it will have to be done a step at a time.
>
> But surely all these developments which I have been describing point to the conclusion that the free nations of Western Europe must draw closely together. I believe the time is ripe for a consolidation of Western Europe.[49]

Bevin also struck the key which had been the main note in the Labour

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47. Ibid., 391.

48. Ibid., 392.

49. Ibid., 395-96.

Government's foreign-policy—that note which had caused so much dissention within the ranks of the Labour Party itself—when he paid tribute to the United States and stressed the importance of good relations between the two countries.[50] Near the conclusion of his address was a final cautious reference to the necessity for a "spiritual union" in Europe rather than "a rigid system":

> To conclude, His Majesty's Government have striven for the closer consolidation and economic development, and eventually for the spiritual unity, of Europe as a whole; but, as I have said, in Eastern Europe we are presented with a fait accompli . . . . If we are to have an organism in the West it must be a spiritual union. While, no doubt, there must be treaties or, at least, understandings the union must primarily be a fusion derived from the basic freedoms and ethical principles for which we all stand. . . . It cannot be written down in a rigid thesis or in a directive. It is more of a brotherhood and less of a rigid system.[51]

This speech not only laid the onus for world friction squarely upon the shoulders of the Soviet Government, but identified it as Britain's enemy for the first time since the war.[52] It also forthrightly presented the Labour Government's view on the nature of European union. Bevin did not envisage, like Churchill, a United States of Europe. He

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50. "Even [sic] since 1945, this Churchillian thesis [that nothing must be permitted to prejudice the Anglo-American alliance] repeated on an elaborate scale in the Fulton speech, has been haunting the Labour Government. Implicitly or explicitly, it has been the dividing line between Left and Right. The Right of the Labour Party has shared Mr. Churchill's view that in the last resort we must always stand by the United States right or wrong, Left-wing Socialists have seen more clearly the dangers of a partnership in which Britain always gives way." "Ourselves and America."

51. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CDXLVI (1946), 407-408.

52. "Now the enemy was defined and named; henceforward, the need for innuendo, euphemism and circumlocution was past." Edelman, op. cit., 86.

stressed a "spiritual union" or "brotherhood" which would have as its basis not a political or federal union but a system of alliances. Even this "spiritual union" would take time and proceed step by step among "nations which are free to take their own decisions."

As Bevin indicated in his address of January 22, the first step in this alliance system--for that is what Bevin meant by union--had taken place with Russian knowledge and tacit approval.[53] On March 4, 1947, England had signed the purely defensive Treaty of Dunkirk with France against any future aggression on the part of Germany.[54] After Bevin's address of January 22 had paved the way,[55] this treaty served as the basis for the fifty-year treaty of collective military aid and economic and social cooperation, known as the Brussels Pact, among England, France and the three Benelux countries. The treaty was signed March 17, 1948--two months after Bevin's historic vilification of Russian policies.

The New Statesman and Nation noted the pleasure with which Bevin's pronouncements were received by most members of Parliament:

> The project of Western Union . . . was greeted at the outset with a sense of relief and fulfilment by all except the Communists. To the Tories it meant an extension of Fulton; to the Socialists it meant a positive alternative to Communism . . . . The doctrine of Western Union will obviously soon have its heretics and schismatics, all claimants to the true faith. Among the Tory back-benchers, from Nutting to Beamish, there seemed little idea that it meant anything but a negative

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53. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CDXLVI (1948), 391.

54. Robert Schuman, op. cit., 351.

55. "As a result of Secretary Bevin's speech on January 22, Britain, France and the Benelux countries signed the so-called Brussels Pact on March 17, 1948." Fay, op. cit., 158.

> alliance against Russia. . . . Churchill . . . [declared] his full support for the Foreign Secretary, the "man with the labouring oar."[56]

On January 23, the day following Bevin's speech, Churchill told the House of Commons: "I cannot help . . . feeling content to see that not only the British, but the American Government, have adopted to a very large extent the views which I expressed at Fulton nearly two years ago, and have, indeed, gone in many ways far beyond them."[57] Here, then, was vindication of Fulton (and Zurich[58]). "I was much criticised," Churchill continued, "on both sides of the Atlantic for the Fulton speech, but in almost every detail, and certainly in the spirit and in its moderation, what I there urged has now become the accepted policy of the English-speaking world."[59] Churchill was right.[60] An appal-

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56. Edelman, op. cit., 86.

57. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CDXLVI (1946), 552.

58. Ibid., 553.

59. Ibid., 552.

60. The situation was neatly summed up in The New Statesman and Nation: "Those who hoped that the foreign affairs debate last week would mark a notable advance in the Government's foreign policy may be disappointed. The Foreign Secretary's statement, blessing a Western Union, was unimpeachable; but it enabled Mr. Churchill to urge quite disingenuously that it signalled the final conversion of the Labour Government to the principles of the Fulton speech and of his own United Europe movement. . . . Mr. Attlee's notable reply to the debate, which contradicted the whole Churchillian philosophy and gave to Western Union a constructive Socialist framework, came too late to repair the damage. Even so friendly and well-informed a paper as the New York Herald Tribune came to the conclusion: 'A year ago there was still a strong body which held that Britain could occupy a middle ground between the Soviet Union and the United States, and might even in concert with the other democracies of Western Europe help bridge the gap between these two World Powers. The basis for such a policy no longer exists, and Mr. Bevin's state-

lingly intransigent Soviet foreign policy had driven Britain completely into the American orbit. Gone were the days when Great Britain could play the part of mediator between two great conflicting forces; gone the illusion of "friendship" with Soviet Russia and the possibility of East-West accord; gone, too perhaps, Britain's chance for security and peace. The enemy was named, the position explained, and the Labour Government set itself the task of creating an old-fashioned type of security based on a series of alliances which it blandly called Western Union.

But not before the Prime Minister, himself, officially gave his blessings to the project of Western union. On January 23, the same day Churchill called the world's attention to what he considered the vindication of his Fulton prophecy, and the day following Bevin's doleful harangue, Clement Attlee[61] in the House of Commons stated in his deliberate, unaffected manner:

> Union of Europe is a fruitful idea. It has been put forward many times in the past—it has been taken up and dropped again; but it is a fruitful idea. It is . . . something that wants to be done under the larger unity of the United Nations—European civilisation has spread all over the world, and our democratic ideas are not confined to Europe, but have spread throughout the world. While I

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ment of the hard fact will therefore meet with no serious opposition.'" "The Perils of Ambiguity," XXIV (January 31, 1948), 85.

61. McClellan pointed out that long before this date, both Bevin and Attlee had earlier records "in favor of wider economic co-operation in Europe. Attlee in 1939 declared that 'Europe must unite or perish', and Bevin . . . /could/ point to his advocacy of unified economic services in Europe at a Trade Union Congress in 1927."
Foreign Policy Reports, XXIV (October 15, 1948), 124. /Italics added./

> think that the idea of a united Europe is one which is most fruitful, we must be careful not to think that it is something exclusive, and something which excludes the rest of the world.[62]

Here was the same caution (plus a vagueness which hinted at a world unity) found in Bevin's speech of the day before. It was evident that the Labour Government's union and the one apparently advocated by Churchill and his European cohorts would be of quite different varieties. They were as different as an alliance system could be from a United States of Europe.

On the matter of British-Russian relations the Prime Minister was much more explicit. In the minds of any of the Russophiles there could be little doubt where the Labour Government stood after Attlee has thrust the Bevin lance yet deeper into a past "friend" and ally:

> Russian Communism is distinctly Russian. Communism is an old word with very respectable antecedents. This particular form of Communism is Russian Communism, an economic doctrine wedded to the policy of a backward State, which has but very slight appeal to those who have experience of Western civilisation but makes a strong appeal to backward people who have never known anything better.[63]

Attlee stilled the laughter which came from both sides of the House with his next statement: "This is a serious statement."[64] Indeed, it was. The British Government had, with the speeches of Bevin and Attlee, admitted failure to mediate between the East and West, and it had unequivocably stated unwillingness to dwell any longer in the Cloud-Cuckoo Land of Russian "friendship". The fait accompli of July 1947,

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62. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CDXLVI (1948), 615.

63. Ibid., 617.

64. Ibid.

was officially recognized by the Labour Government and East-West dichotomy became the accepted basis upon which to launch a new foreign policy.

On March 17, 1948, two months after Bevin's speech, the next big step was taken with conclusion of the fifty-year Brussels Pact. This treaty pledged the signatories--Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom--to aid one another with military and other assistance if one of them should be attacked in Europe. The treaty also provided for the cooperation of the five powers in economic, social and cultural areas.[65] The main organ of this Brussels Pact was the Council of Western Powers, composed of the Foreign Ministers of the five signatories, which ultimately summoned the conference which in turn drafted the Statute of the Council of Europe.

Thus the second step was taken in the alliance system which represented the Attlee-Bevin concept of Western union.[66] But the Labour Government seemed unwilling to go further at this time in a European union. This was indicated by its objections to the French proposal in the Consultative Council of Western Powers in July, 1948, for the organization of a European Assembly. French Foreign Minister Bidault proposed a European Assembly be created representing the Brussels Pact signers and other nations which might wish to participate. The British

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65. United Nations Treaty Series (1948), XIX, 51-63.

66. "A majority of this party [Labour] had long been advocating a European union based on the organization of the Socialist parties throughout Europe into a kind of 'Third Force'. But Bevin had finally persuaded them to abandon this horizontal party plan of organization in favor of his own plan of a vertical alliance between states." Fay, op. cit., 159.

opposed this fearing that such an Assembly would be dominated by Communists or other continental radicals.[67] McClellan has pointed out that while continentals regarded the Brussels Pact as "an advanced step toward federation, Bevin's intentionally vague words that 'time was ripe for consolidation in Europe' . . . more nearly represented his exact views."[68] The Labour Government was not prepared at this time to see its steps for an alliance system develop in the direction of a fully elaborated political system. This was made evident several months before the French proposal was officially made in the Consultative Council when the British Government tried to boycott The Hague Conference for European Unity.[69]

The International Committee of the Movements for European Unity under the chairmanship of Duncan Sandys, British Conservative MP and Churchill's son-in-law, succeeded in convoking The Hague Conference for European Unity in the old Ridderzaal, or Hall of Knights, in Amsterdam on May 8-10, 1948. "This somewhat amateur and often rather disorderly congress was the object of much derision"[70] and was referred

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67. Carey, op. cit., 71-72.

68. Foreign Policy Reports, XXIV (October 15, 1948), 124-25.

69. It may be noted that the shyness of the British Labour Government to this French proposal for union was not new. It has an interesting antecedent in a previous Labour Government's refusal to take part in the Briand proposal for the creation of a European Federal Union. Galin pointed out that the British Labour Government's note of July 16, 1930, "after several complimentary remarks to the French Government, went on to say that: 'His Majesty's Government think it possible that an exclusive and independent European Union of the kind proposed might emphasize or create tendencies to inter-continental rivalries and hostilities which it is important in the general to diminish and avoid.'" Op. cit., 410.

70. Macmillan, op. cit., 345.

to as a "manifestation of idealism on an international level."[71]

Regardless of its aspiration, its unofficial character, or its star-studded cast of characters ranging from Princess Juliana of the Netherlands and the heads of State of most European Governments to delegates from Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary, the Labour Government of Britain was inexorably opposed to the Conference which it considered Churchill's doing. It had been largely through the efforts of Churchill's United Europe Movement, one of the five organisations which made up the International Committee of the Movements of European Unity, that the Conference was called.[72] Churchill was the main speaker, and as many had expected beforehand, he was elected honorary president of the Conference. The Illustrated London News grasped the cause of the Labour Party's opposition to the Conference:

> The Conference of The Hague under the presidency of Mr. Winston Churchill has caused some curious reactions in the ranks of the Labour Party. They have been inclined to proclaim in effect that the cause is a good one, but that the ally is not acceptable. . . . Reports have been published that the individual Labour Members of Parliament and other Socialists who had expressed their intention of going to The Hague would be persuaded to keep away and might at least be chided if they persisted. Later on it appeared possible that, while individuals of the party might go without reproof, Socialists would be in no way officially represented.[73]

The Spectator (London) referred to the fact that, although the speeches were very much to the point and while "the Congress was a great

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71. Peter Fleming, "Churchill at The Hague," The Spectator (London), CLXXI (May 14, 1948), 580.

72. McClellan, Foreign Policy Reports, XXIV (October 15, 1948), 122-24.

73. Cyril Falls, "Approach to Western European Union," CCXII (May 8, 1948), 518.

manifestation in favour of a United Europe," British influence could be little felt.[74] The Spectator also piqued the Labour Government for its ineffectual attempt to boycott the Conference:

> The second thing that struck me was what a feeble sort of showing the British Labour Party made. To boycott the Congress was in the first place a petty and rather irresponsible thing to do, and the reasons given for the boycott were embarrassingly disingenuous; and to be unable, in the event, to make the boycott effective produced an impression of plain silliness which completely baffled the less sophisated of the foreign delegates.[75]

Churchill's "Plea for European Unity" speech, addressed to seven hundred members--of which sixty-four were members of the British Parliament[76]--at The Hague Conference, went beyond his Zurich speech with the suggestion that European unity might require the merger of some sovereignty:

> It is impossible to separate economics and defense from general political structure. Mutual aid in the economic field and joint military defense must inevitably be accompanied step by step with a parallel policy of closer unity.
>
> It is said with truth that this involves some sacrifice, or merger, of national sovereignty.[77]

Welcoming the German delegation to The Hague, Churchill broached the most intricate problem facing the proposed European union--that of Germany. To restore the economic stability of Germany and at the same

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74. Juraj Krnjevic, "Reply to Churchill at The Hague," CLXXI (May 21, 1948), 615.

75. Fleming, op. cit., 581

76. Junius B. Wood, "Is a United States of Europe Practical?", National Business, XXXVI (August, 1948), 33.

77. Winston Churchill, "The Voice of Europe," Vital Speeches of the Day, XIV (May 15, 1948), 451.

time to insure the security of Germany's western neighbors, especially France, was to be one of the most perplexing problems which later faced the Council of Europe. Here, too, Churchill set forth one of the chief arguments used by those who favored European union, that is that only within the framework of a European union could Germany be brought back into the community of nations.

> For us the German problem is to restore the economic life of Germany and revive the ancient frame of the German race without thereby exposing their neighbors and ourselves to any rebuilding or reassertion of that military power of which we still bear the scars.
>
> United Europe provides the only solution which can be adopted practically and without delay.[78]

In this oration Churchill also gave some indication that Great Britain and her Commonwealth might be in some way associated--but not joined--with this United Europe. Referring to the necessity for a third power group in the world he said:

> Thus I saw the vast Soviet Union forming one of these great groups. The Council of Europe, /not yet established/ including Great Britain, joined with Empire and Commonwealth, would be another. Thirdly, the Western Hemisphere, with all its great spheres of interest and influence, has largely become effective . . . .
>
> Here at The Hague we are now met to help our various governments to create the new Europe. . .the third great and equal partner, without whose active aid the world organisation cannot function nor the shadow of war be lifted from the hearts and minds of men and nations.[79]

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78. Ibid.

79. Ibid., 451-52.

Thus, hunched in his frock-coat[80] in the Hall of Knights at The Hague, Churchill reiterated the Olympian call for union he had made at Zurich a year and a half before. It is little wonder that, drunk from these promising draughts of heady Churchillian oratory, Paul Reynaud put forward a motion calling for the immediate creation of a European Assembly elected by universal suffrage.[81] His proposal received little support, but it indicated the growth of the European union idea. A more practical and enthusiastically supported proposal of The Hague Conference called for a pledge from all participants to work for a Charter of Human Rights, a Court of Justice and "a European Assembly, to be chosen by the parliaments of the participating states, to devise measures for attaining a full political and economic union 'open to all European nations democratically governed.'"[82]

Thus under Churchill's inspiration and leadership the cause of European union received a great impetus at The Hague in May 1948. The Spectator did not have to remind the Labour Government of the great leadership qualities of the Opposition leader, but it did anyway:

> The Hague showed--reminded us, rather--how singular is Mr. Churchill's gift for leadership. Without him the Congress would probably not have happened, and would almost certainly not have succeeded if it had happened.[83]

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80. Peter Fleming described Churchill at The Hague Conference as "hunched in his frock-coat, benignly and rather ponderously settling his cigar in his mouth like a Giant Panda consuming a bamboo-shoot." Op. cit., 581.

81. Courtin, op. cit., 13.

82. Frederick Schuman, The American Political Science Review, XLV (September, 1951), 727.

83. Fleming, op. cit., 581.

This very reason--Churchill's leadership of European union and the part which his United Europe Movement had played in convoking The Hague Conference--had caused Labour leaders to try to boycott this demonstration for European unity.

While the Conference was in session, Prime Minister Attlee announced the British Labour Government's opposition to Reynaud's proposal for a European Assembly. Following the adjournment of the Conference, the British Labour Party met to approve the idea of a federated Europe and demanded a United Socialist State of Europe.[84] This action was belated and of little avail, for Churchill, with the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity and the Hague Conference, had won the day.

The Hague Conference had issued a memorandum calling on Western European countries to commence discussions for forming a European Parliament. The French Cabinet, meeting with President Vincent Auriol on August 18, 1948, voted to invite the Brussels Pact Powers to consider setting up a parliament for Europe.[85] When on July 19, 1948, at a meeting of the Consultative Council of Western Powers, the French Foreign Minister, Bidault of the Schuman Government, proposed the creation of a European Assembly representing the Governments of the Brussels Pact countries,[86] the British Labour Government could do little but drag its feet. Its firmness on the question of European union was to offer the

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84. Wood, op. cit., 34.

85. McClellan, Foreign Policy Reports, XXIV (October 15, 1948), 124.

86. Carey, op. cit., 71.

world a good example of political myopia--a short-sightness, by the way, of which Churchill, with the aid of the European Movement,[87] was to make the most.

Ernest Bevin, supported by Foreign Minister Spaak of Belgium, was not prepared to commit himself on Bidault's proposal for a European Assembly. After all, this proposal, which was a result of The Hague Conference, was more "the rigid system" and less the "brotherhood" which Bevin had in mind when he had made his speech on foreign policy on January 22, 1948. But Bevin and Spaak did agree to the establishment of a "Committee for the Study of European Unity."[88] This Committee met in Paris on November 26, 1948, but adjourned two months later, January 20, 1949, as a result of a deadlock between the French who wanted a European Assembly to consist of delegates chosen by National legislatures and the British who proposed a Council of Ministers selected by Cabinets.[89]

"Not least among the reasons for the British Government's reluctance was the fact that the concept of the Council of Europe owed its inspiration to Mr. Churchill. In answer to criticism of his dilatory

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87. Following The Hague Conference, the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity met in Brussels on October 25, 1948 to form the European Movement under the joint presidency of Léon Blum, Alcide de Gasperi, Paul-Henri Spaak and, of course, Winston Churchill. Loveday, op. cit., 621.

    At a Conference of the European Movement on February 25-28, 1949, it was organized on a permanent basis. Frederick Schuman, The American Political Science Review, XLV (September, 1951), 729.

88. Frederick Schuman, The American Political Science Review, XLV (September, 1951), 729.

89. Ibid.

tactics, British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin replied that he wished to avoid a 'mere talking-shop for the passing of resolution.'"[90] Other reasons for failure of Committee members to agree were the British insistence that the Communists should not be represented in the proposed Assembly and that matters of defense should not be discussed.[91] A compromise was reached at subsequent meetings of the Western Powers, and finally, through the auspices of the European Movement which aided in drafting a constitution, the five Brussels-Pact Powers and five other European states[92] signed the Statute of the Council of Europe on May 5, 1949.[93]

These last steps, taken by the Labour Government of Great Britain, were hesitant steps indeed. The Labour Government was not in favor of this "talking-shop" and but for pressure within the Labour Party from the Crossman and Mackay groups and the Conservative Party pressure for union, as well as the wide favor the project enjoyed in the United States, it is unlikely that Attlee and Bevin would have taken these last steps. As late as August 1948, Attlee, in a letter to Winston Churchill,[94] had indicated the reluctance of the British Government to support attempts to create a European Assembly. The British Govern-

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90. Carey, op. cit., 71-72.

91. Frederick Schuman, The American Political Science Review, XLV (September, 1951), 729.

92. The five other Powers were: Eire, Denmark, Italy, Norway and Sweden.

93. Ibid.

94. New York Times, August 26, 1948, p. 4.

ment could recognize a fait-accompli, as it had on January 22, 1948; nevertheless, these steps had been taken grudgingly, and it looked on the Council of Europe with a suspicion that bordered on distrust.

The organisation which the Statute of London called into being would not be free from flaws: its Statute contained the seeds of a great conflict between the two main bodies, the Council of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly; the enthusiastic delegates, which jubilantly flocked to the Assembly's first meeting in August, 1949, became bogged down in a morass of conflicting opinions concerning the form of their common aspiration--European Union; and hesitant British Labour delegates were to pursue a policy which many well-wishers of union, on both sides of the Channel, would brand as "obstructionism"--a policy which led some to attribute what they regarded as the "failure" of the newly-created Council of Europe to the Labour Government.

CHAPTER III

LABOUR GOVERNMENT AND CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 1949-1950

> The Council of Europe's deepest difficulties are inherent in the nature of the organization, /and/ its most significant achievements have come through attempts to surmount these weaknesses.--Ruth C. Lawson, Associate Professor of Political Science at Mount Holyoke College[1]

Organization of the Council of Europe

The Statute of the Council of Europe, signed by ten nations[2] on May 5, 1949, provided for three main organs. The Council of Ministers was composed of the Foreign Ministers of Member states or their alternatives. The Consultative Assembly was made up of delegates chosen by the Parliaments of the Governments of Member countries. A Secretariat was appointed by the Consultative Assembly on the recommendation of the Committee of Ministers.[3] Two additional agencies evolved from meetings of the 1949 and 1950 Sessions of the Council. The Standing Committee of the Assembly met at regular intervals between sessions of the Assembly to insure continuity. The Joint Committee, consisting of four members

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1. "European Union or Atlantic Union?", Current History, XIX (December, 1950), 328.

2. Kingdom of Belgium, Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Irish Republic, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. International Organization, III (1949), 583.

3. Ibid.

of the Committee of Ministers and five members of the Standing Committee of the Assembly, furnished greatly needed liaison between the Committee of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly.[4]

Chapter IV of the Statute set up the Committee of Ministers comprising the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Member states, or their alternates, who should be members of the Government of their respective country. Each representative in the Committee of Ministers was entitled to one vote, and with minor exceptions all resolutions required the unanimous vote of the representatives casting a vote, and of a majority of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee. Meetings of the Committee were to be private, and the Committee decided what information would be published regarding the conclusions and discussions held in private session. The main duty of the Committee of Ministers was to refer to Member Governments the Recommendations received from the Consultative Assembly, if by a unanimous vote of the Committee it regarded such Recommendations to be within the aim of the Council "to achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.[5] The Committee might, also, on its own initiative, make Recommendations to Member Governments by a unanimous vote of its representatives. The Committee was not an executive body for it could not put its own, or the Assembly's Recommendations into effect. It might merely make Recommendations to Member

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4. Carleton, op. cit., 182.

5. International Organization, III (1949), 583.

countries and request the Governments of Members to inform it of the action taken on its Recommendations.[6]

The Consultative Assembly, theoretically the most important body of the Council of Europe, was provided for in Chapter V of the Statute. It "is the deliberative organ of the Council of Europe, and it shall debate matters within its competence . . . and present its conclusions in the form of recommendations, to the Committee of Ministers."[7] Article 23, limiting the area open to discussion to those matters which were referred to the Assembly by the Committee of Ministers, or included on the Assembly's agenda made up by the Committee, would have greatly limited the discussions in the Assembly, if the Assembly had abided by the Statute. However, from the first sittings of the first Session in August of 1949, it was clear that the Assembly would not be content to allow the Committee of Ministers to dictate its area of discussion. Meetings of the Consultative Assembly were to take place once a year. Since 1950, meetings have been divided into two parts spaced several months apart.[8] All acts of the Assembly required a two-thirds majority of the representatives casting a vote. Debate was in public, unless the Assembly decided otherwise. The Assembly was not a legislative body; it could not make laws. Nor were its delegates representatives of Member countries. They would be appointed "in such a manner as the Government of that member shall decide,"[9] with the

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6. Ibid., 585-87.

7. Ibid., 587.

8. August and November in 1950, May, November and December in 1951, and May and September in 1952.

9. Ibid.

added restriction that each delegate must be a national of the country which appointed him to its delegation. "This body of 125 Representatives," as Frederick Schuman indicated, "is neither a diplomatic conference, since its members do not speak for their governments, nor a legislature, since they cannot make law."[10] Delegates to the Assembly spoke and voted as individuals, and as Europeans, not as representatives of particular countries.[11]

The Secretariat, provided for in Chapter VI of the Statute, consisted of a Secretary-General and Deputy appointed by the Assembly on the recommendation of the Committee of Ministers. The Secretary-General could appoint an adequate staff.[12]

The Statute of the Council of Europe, a multilateral treaty of forty-two articles, came into effect on August 3, 1949, when Luxembourg, Norway and Italy deposited their instruments of ratification with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This furnished seven members, enough to bring the Statute into effect, since the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden and Ireland had already ratified the Statute.[13]

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10. The American Political Science Review, XLV (September, 1951), 732.

11. International Organization, III (1949), 587-89.

12. Ibid., 589.

13. Frederick Schuman, The American Political Science Review, XLV (September, 1951), 729.

The Assembly versus the Committee of Ministers

From the beginning the Assembly suffered from a certain amount of megalomania. The Assembly's desire for power to overcome the limitations of its Statute resulted in a struggle between the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers. For the most part, this conflict was abetted by Continental Federalists within the European Movement. In this struggle the Conservative delegation, actively and tacitly, supported the European Movement in its campaign to strengthen the position of the Assembly.

In the sixth sitting of the Assembly on August 17, 1949, Harold Macmillan, Maxwell Fyfe, Robert Boothby, Ronald Ross and Harold Eccles, all members of the British Conservative delegation, made eight proposals which included the following:

> 1. An extraordinary Session of the Assembly be held in January, 1950, at which the Assembly should decide, without the approval of the Committee of its own Agenda which shall in any event include the matters recommended by the Committee of Ministers . . .
>
> 6. That the Committee of Ministers shall report to the Assembly at the beginning of each session, and be prepared to answer questions put to them by the Assembly arising out of the reports;
>
> 7. That the Committee of Ministers be requested to secure that the recommendations made by the Assembly at its first Session be placed before the national Parliaments for debate;
>
> 8. That the Statute of Europe be amended, where necessary, to carry out the above recommendations.[14]

Another motion proposed that the Assembly be given the power to approve

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14. Agendas; Minutes (1st session), pp. 25-26.

any invitation of the Committee of Ministers to any European state to become a member of the Council. Yet another proposal was for a special Assembly Secretariat appointed by the Assembly and responsible solely to it.[15]

The British Labour delegates did not support these Conservative motions for more Assembly control over its agenda, membership and Statute, and for power to submit its Recommendations directly to the Parliaments of Member states. Rather, the Labour delegation supported a proposal by R. W. G. Mackay, Labour delegate[16] and long-time advocate of European union, for "the creation of an European political authority with limited functions but real powers."[17]

Despite his sponsorship of proposals for more power for the Assembly, Harold Macmillan, Conservative delegate, was one of the first to speak out against any attempt to set the Assembly against the Committee of Ministers.

> I think it is right that we should deplore any attempt to set the Assembly against the Committee of Ministers. . . .
>
> The Governments have given us a constitution. Let us build upon it. The Committee of Ministers is a European Cabinet in embryo. The Consultative Assembly is a European Parliament in embryo. This constitution can be made more flexible and more effective.[18]

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15. Ibid., 26.

16. Members of the British Parliament, as well as members of other Governments, will be referred to as delegates in discussion concerning the Consultative Assembly, and the abbreviation MP will be used when referring to British Labour and Conservative Member of Parliament in debates in the House of Commons.

17. Ibid.

18. Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly (1st session), Reports Part I (Strasbourg: 1949), I, 125-27.

Other delegates expressed similar sentiments.[19]

While some delegates deplored the rift which was developing between the Ministers and the Assembly, others sought to widen it by attacking the Statute and the Ministers. "The statute," said delegate La Malfa of Italy, "as it now stands, is of no use whatever for the aims we intend to achieve."[20] Delegate Kistensen of Denmark even complained that the Assembly had not made the Statute, but that it had been made for them. In debate in the 1949 Session, he continued his attack on the Statute, saying: "Many of us here feel that too much power is given to the Committee of Ministers and too little to the Assembly."[21] This rift was greatly widened by the conflict which resulted in the Assembly's fight to gain control over its agenda.

The agenda which the Committee of Ministers had approved for the 1949 Session of the Assembly was quite different from the one which the Assembly approved for itself. The Ministers' agenda included dis-

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19. Delegate Gmitt-Ingebretsen of Norway said, "I regret this Assembly should give the impression that the Committee of Ministers and the Representatives of the people are fighting each other. It is a mistake. We are all working towards the same objective." Ibid., 128.

    Ungoed-Thomas, Labour delegate, said, "It is fantastic to suggest . . . that we the Assembly are somehow or other the voice of the people, and that the Committee of Ministers is a collection of irresponsible autocrats. I regret that attempts should have been made in the course of this Session to set the Assembly against the Committee of Ministers. It would be fatal to European union for this Assembly to become an instrument of opposition against Governments."
    Ibid., 88.

20. Ibid., 131.

21. Ibid., 82.

cussion of the role of the Council in the economic field, the field of social security and the methods by which the Council should develop cultural cooperation. The Assembly's agenda, to which the Committee of Ministers acceded, added discussions of human rights, consideration of any necessary changes in the political structure of Europe, general aims of the Council, revisions of the Statute, matters of European nationality and passports, major public works programs, a European patent office, and closer cooperation in scientific research and technical developments.[22]

The innocuous content of the Ministers' agenda contrasted notably with the almost revolutionary content of the Assembly's agenda. The item calling for a "consideration of any necessary changes in the political structure of Europe" was sponsored by Winston Churchill, Lord Layton, Liberal delegate, and members from France, Norway, Greece, Turkey,[23] and Italy. The debate on this item clearly revealed the divergent opinions held by delegates, even within the same national party, as to the direction, form, and feasibility of changes in the political structure of Europe to effect union.

Churchill, supported by the British Conservative delegation and the European Movement, took the lead in the fight to increase the

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22. International Organization, III (1949), 729-30.

23. The Committee of Ministers, meeting before the Consultative Assembly at Strasbourg on August 8th, had invited Greece and Turkey to become members of the Council. Ireland was also invited to participate, although she was not expected to ratify the Statute until 1950. This brought to twelve the number of countries participating in the 1949 Session.
Ibid., 729.

powers of the Assembly. He insisted that "the Assembly should be the real focusing point of European opinion on all major issues and that the Committee of Ministers should refrain from exercising the control given it by the statute over the Assembly's agenda."[24] Before the 1949 Session adjourned the Assembly asked for the following increase in powers:

1. The right to admit new members;
2. the right to draft and approve its own agenda;
3. a change in the position of the secretary-general of the Council so that he would be responsible to the Assembly as well as to the Committee of Ministers, with a deputy-secretary-general to be appointed for the Assembly;
4. abolition of alternates for delegates to the Assembly.[25]

Thus the tug-of-war between the Assembly and the Ministers was initiated. When the Committee of Ministers chose to ignore most of the Recommendations of the 1949 Session of the Consultative Assembly, the conflict became more strained, and the 1950 Session opened in what President Spaak called "a real atmosphere of crisis."[26]

Conflict between Labour and Conservative Delegates

While Churchill and the Conservative delegates in the Assembly championed the cause of the Assembly over the Committee of Ministers, the Labour delegates pursued a more moderate course and did not support the proposals for increased powers. As has been indicated, they

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24. Ibid., 730-33; see also, Reports Part I (1st session), I, 149-50.
25. International Organization, III (1949), 731.
26. Vital Speeches, XVII (March 15, 1951), 325.

supported the Mackay proposal, adopted by the 1949 Session, for "the creation of an European political authority with limited functions but real powers." For the most part, Labour delegates favored a gradual, step by step, approach to the problem of union, while the Conservatives, in more general, yet rhetorical, terms, expressed their approval of a union which would require some concessions of sovereignty. Although most Conservatives regarded close British cooperation as essential to union, they did not, with the exception of Robert Boothby, regard Britain as a participant in the union.

The split in the British delegation between Labour and Conservatives was especially apparent in the debate on the proposal of Churchill and cohorts calling for "consideration of any necessary changes in the political structure of Europe." This was debated in the fifth and sixth sittings on August 16-17, 1949. In the speeches of the British delegates there were numerous inferences of "demagoguery," of "obstructionism" and of "irresponsibility." Labour delegates pointed out the inconsistency of groups or individuals who proposed European union to the world yet opposed planning at home and inter-governmental cooperation abroad. Such attacks led R. H. S. Crossman to make the following observation in The New Statesman and Nation:

> Two cracks--both of course by Frenchmen--sum up the attitude of the other members of the European Assembly towards their British colleagues. The first is the remark that the General Election is being won on the playing fields of Strasbourg; the other is the wholly mystical story that a certain very distinguished British expert, attached to the Assembly staff, has only one sentence of French: "Pas en Angleterre."[27]

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27. "Pas En Angleterre", XXXVIII (September 10, 1949), 264.

The bickering which took place during the debate on the necessary changes in the political structure of Europe did indeed substantiate this discerning observation.

Harold Macmillan, Conservative delegate, may have been vague, but he was oratorical in his comments on the debate:

> There are many, who had only scoffs and jeers against this movement two years ago who are now either genuine converts or at least find it necessary to give lip-service to this project. Let no one forget that and let us never again use the word "impossible". We are doing the impossible.[28]

Undoubtedly this little quip was directed to the British Labour Government for its hesitancy in furthering the cause of European union. There can be no doubt that Macmillan considered the Labour Government as the convert who now found it expedient to pay lip-service to union.

Robert Boothby, Conservative delegate, went further. Nor was he vague in his proposal for the pooling of national sovereignty:

> For my part, I am convinced that the doctrine of the sovereign equality of nations is not only nonsense but a mathematical formula for war. . . . I hold the view that the only solution of this problem lies in some merging or pooling of national sovereignty--not so much the surrender as the joint exercise by common agreement of certain defined sovereign powers.[29]

Lord Layton, Liberal delegate, who supported most of the Conservative proposals, agreed with Boothby that some merging of sovereignty was necessary. "We should now go forward," Layton asserted, "boldly towards federation. . . . People will accept sweeping changes in desperate times."[30]

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28. Reports Part I (1st session), I, 125.

29. Ibid., 94.

30. Ibid., 83.

Labour delegate Lee met Macmillan's challenge and piqued the Conservative delegation by warning "those who are opposed to planning on a national scale, and yet lead the movement for European unity . . . are fast placing themselves in a quite impossible position."[31]

R. W. G. Mackay, Labour delegate, attacked Churchill himself:

> Mr. Winston Churchill the respected Leader of the Opposition in the British Parliament . . . has played a large part in developing the idea of Western European unity. In a very important speech in Britain a few weeks ago, he said that the economic policy of his party was that the home market should be first, the Commonwealth second and the foreigners third. That is not basis for any conception of a European union.[32]

Herbert Morrison, joining his Labour colleagues, made reference to the British electorate and accused the Conservatives of demagogy in the Assembly:

> If an opposition party of any country believe that the Government is wrong; if, for example, it should hold that the Government's approach to the problems of European unity is too cautious, then it should present its alternative proposals to the electorate and make no secret of them. If it is not prepared to do this, then criticism of its Government's behaviour, here or anywhere else, is mere empty demagogy. . . .
>
> We must be honest with ourselves; and we must be honest with our people. When I say "honest", one thing I mean is that we should not say in Strasbourg anything by which we would not be prepared to stand or fall before our respective electorates.[33]

Morrison then urged a slow, gradual approach to European union.

Maurice Edelman, Labour delegate, denounced the Conservative

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31. Ibid., 152.

32. Ibid., 140.

33. Ibid., 123-24.

delegation for its hypocrisy and spoke out even more plainly for a gradual approach to union through a functional method:

> If I turn from this idea and approach our problem in a pragmatic manner, I hope it will not be thought I am turning my back on the possibility that one day we may be in a federal Europe. But if we were merely to draft pretentious paper constitutions which would not command the adherence of either our governments or our parties, then, indeed, it would have excited among vast numbers of people hopes which would be dashed to the ground. It is my belief that we must serve an apprenticeship of practical co-operation before we can advance to a real European unity. . . .
>
> I believe that we in this Assembly can make the most practical contribution to European unity if we propose a system of functional and working co-operation between our various countries, rather than by attempting to draft an ideal constitution to which in practice the Governments may not adhere. . . . I deplore the hypocrisy of anyone who while paying lip-service to the cause of European unity at Strasbourg is none the less prepared to make economic nationalism and imperial exclusiveness the keystone to an election manifesto at home. I cannot help thinking that of all demagogies there is none worse than that which simultaneously appeals to the ideal and to the most selfish in men.[34]

Labour delegate Crawley probably clearly evaluated the general European attitude towards union when he stated:

> Mr. Boothby said that he thought the meeting of this Assembly was proof of the desire of Europe to unite. I must confess that I have yet to be convinced of that. The more I study the question of European unity, the more I am impressed by the powerful voices which are still raised against European unity. . . .
>
> I think it would be misleading to suggest that there is in Britain a majority of opinion actively in favour of European unity. . . . I sometimes feel that even those who are most rhetorical in support of the idea of unity, when it comes to the practical difficulties, instinctively fall back on the idea rather of an English-speaking union. In short, I would say that in my country if one were to take the majority view it would be that although we must collaborate

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34. Ibid., 98.

> as far as possible with Europe, nothing must be done which would in any way prejudice our relations with the Commonwealth of which could in any way hamper our relationship with the United States. . . . But whereas I believe that many of my countrymen put co-operation with Europe last in the order of priorities, I myself put it first. I do, therefore, believe in Western Union and in the policy of ultimate federation in Europe. I agree with those who say it is a matter of life and death, but in saying that I still believe that I am in a minority, and that those of us who hold those views are in a minority in nearly all Member countries.[35]

Here, indeed, was realism, honesty and, as events would prove, a precise evaluation of the sincerity of those who advocated union.

The great majority of delegates from Continental countries, excepting those from Scandinavia, spoke in favor of a union in which national sovereignty would be pooled or merged. Among these were Persico of Italy,[36] Serrarens[37] and Van Der Goes Van Naters[38] of the Netherlands, Le Bail[39] of France and Roby[40] of Belgium. Other delegates, notably Bastid,[41] Mollet[42] and Bidault,[43] all of France, favored union and the project at Strasbourg, but they were as vague as the British Conservatives as to the form of that union and on the question

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35. Ibid., 106.

36. Ibid., 96.

37. Ibid., 103.

38. Ibid., 91.

39. Ibid., 120.

40. Ibid., 146.

41. Ibid., 134-37.

42. Ibid., 158-61.

43. Ibid., 153-56.

of sovereignty.

Until the last week of the 1949 Session the Conservatives succeeded in giving the impression that they, unlike the Labour delegation, were champions of the Assembly, its "rights", and its aspirations, and that they were in complete accord with all good Europeans who were working for European union. Noting the ability of the Conservatives to get along with all factions, Cyril Falls pointed out in The Illustrated London News that "one of the most amusing, but at the same time quite genuine, features of the Strasbourg meeting was, at least in the early stages, the little love-affair between French Socialists and British Tories."[44] Finally on August 17, Churchill ended this entente cordiale and ended also, for some, the illusion that the Conservatives were as truly champions of European union as they claimed to be. While vague on the question of sovereignty, like most of the Conservative speakers, Churchill was unequivocal in his statements for a gradual approach to union and in his declaration that he was not committed to a federal solution for union.

> We may discuss European problems and try to bring about a sense of unity. We must feel our way forward and, by our good sense, build up an increasing strength and reputation. But we must not attempt on our present electoral basis to change the powers which belong to the duly constituted national Parliaments founded directly upon universal suffrage.
>
> Such a course would be premature. It would be detrimental to our long-term interests. We should, however, do our utmost to secure that these national Parliaments examine and let us know their views upon any Recommendation on European problems that we may make. That, I think, we may require of them. . . . I am not myself committed to a federal or any other particular solution at this stage. . . .

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44. "The First Session at Strasbourg," CCXV (September 24, 1949), 460.

Then, to the consternation of many French delegates, Churchill called for admission of Germany to the Council of Europe.

> I now come, Sir, to the greatest and most important of all the questions that are before us. A united Europe cannot live without the help and strength of Germany. This has always been foreseen by the European Movement, to whose exertions our presence here is due. . . . One of the most practical reasons for pressing forward with the creation of a European Assembly was that it provided an effective means, and possibly the only immediately effective means, of associating a democratic and free Germany with the Western democracies.[45]

Churchill had gone on a holiday immediately after the first sittings of the Assembly. This action had caused no little concern among Continental delegates at the Assembly. When Herbert Morrison, the chief Labour delegate also took leave on a short vacation, the entire British delegation became suspect to many sincere advocate of European union.[46] Churchill's call for caution in challenging "the powers which belong to the duly constituted national Parliaments", and the statement that he was not "committed to a federal or any other particular solution at this stage," only added to the suspicions of many who had regarded him as their spokesman for union. That he called for the entry of Germany into the Council caused many in the French delegation added consternation. Although Churchill remained the "champion" and "hero" of the Assembly and the cause of European unity until his return to office in October 1951, he lost the confidence from this point onward of many of the Continental unionists in the Assembly who favored federation as a means to union.

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45. Reports Part I (1st session), I, 148-49.

46. Crossman, The New Statesman and Nation, XXXVIII (September 10, 1949), 264.

Before this important debate came to a close, De Valera of Ireland summarized the main viewpoints which evolved in the 1949 Session:

> One cannot belong to this Assembly or indeed stay in this City, without becoming sharply conscious of the distinct and well-defined currents of opinion. There is the one in favour of the immediate political union of Europe as a federal State, such a union as would convert this Assembly into a real Parliament with power, by majority vote, to take coercive decisions binding each of the Member States, whether that State or its people were prepared to accept the decisions or not. The other is in favor of proceeding cautiously under the provisions of our present Statute by way of ad hoc agreements on specific matters, with far less thought of general considerations and powers than of practical achievement in the solution of immediate and pressing individual problems.
>
> The first view is taken mainly by the Representatives of States here on the mainland of the Continent. The second is taken by the Representatives of the Island of Britain and, I think, also by the Representatives of my own country, and at least by some of the Representatives of the Scandinavian countries.[47]

Thus this important debate on the necessary changes in the political structure of Europe ended in expression of opinions which revealed Continental unionists to be in favor of federation while British and Scandinavian delegates were in favor of gradual union or functionalism. The latter course would require the setting up of specialized agencies to deal with common problems by international cooperation at the government level in certain well-defined areas. All this time there was mounting friction between the two main bodies of the Council of Europe, the Consultative Assembly and the Committee of Ministers. While the British Conservative delegation championed the "rights" of the Assembly over the Ministers and attempted to control the deliberations of the

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47. Reports Part I (1st session), I, 141.

Assembly through the influence of the European Movement, the Labour delegation, for the most part, sought to ameliorate the conflict between the Assembly and the Ministers and made every effort to expose the Conservatives as pseudo-champions of the federalist cause.

The struggle between federalists and functionalists was decided in favor of the functionalists in the 1950 Session of the Assembly, and the Conservative position then was revealed in its true light. But the struggles between the Conservative and Labour delegates was to go on in the Council of Europe until the Conservatives came back into office in October 1951. By that time conflicts had completely stultified the Assembly, and for all practical purposes the Council of Europe became but another withered limb on the tree of noble European dreams and great aspirations.

Press Reaction to the 1949 Session of the Consultative Assembly

The conflict between the Labour and Conservative Parties did not end when the first session of the Assembly adjourned on September 9, 1949; it raged on in the press for several weeks.

Cyril Falls in his column, "A Window on the World," in The Illustrated London News noted:

> I am quite prepared to admit that in some cases the Tories, finding things going so smoothly, exploited their popularity in a way which must have been exasperating to their political opponents at home, who took pleasure in reminding them in return that nothing they could say or do need affect the policy of the British Government. Yet these feline amenities ought to be considered side-issues, with no effect upon the status or work of the Assembly. Both parties should rise about such pettiness.

Then Falls uttered an appeal and warning:

> It is thus with us, with our country, with the British Government, that the main responsibility lies as to whether or not the Council of Europe will be helped on towards what it might become or virtually condemned to death. Here is a heavy responsibility.[48]

R. H. S. Crossman pointed out in The New Statesman and Nation:

> It is only fair to observe that the Assembly could not have been timed more embarrassingly for the Labour delegates or more happily for the Conservatives. In Opposition, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Macmillan can play the role of "good Europeans" with the certainty that Mr. Bevin will retain [sic] our special position vis-a-vis America, whatever speeches they make. Moreover, at Strasbourg the Conservatives had the extremely efficient machine of the European Movement working for them, and quite deliberately drove the unfortunate Labour Members into an isolationism which came rather too naturally to some of them. Over two-thirds of the delegates in the Assembly, including many Socialists, are members of the European Movement and were, therefore, personally pledged to support the stream of resolutions which Mr. Duncan Sandys assiduously pushed on to the Agenda. By continuing the vendetta on the floor of the Assembly Mr. Morrison, and later Dr. Dalton, seemed to be attacking the idea of European Union itself and to be assuming the insular Socialist role which has for so long been imputed to British Labour. . . . It was almost inevitable that the Labour Members, with the notable exception of Mr. MacKay, [sic] should close their ranks, fight the next election against all comers and make it crystal clear that if Britain has not yet decided between English-speaking and European union, her natural bias is in favour of those, to quote Miss Mitford, "who do not speak those affected foreign languages."[49]

Crossman also mentioned the fact that Churchill's popularity began to wane before the session had come to a close:

> The British Conservatives . . . made a terrific first impression as "good Europeans". But this asset wasted as the days went by. First Mr. Churchill dissipated the grateful admiration felt for him, less by his appeal for the admission of Germany than by conduct well known in the House of Commons, but surprising to those who had worshipped from afar.[50]

48. "The First Session at Strasbourg," XXXV (September 24, 1949), 460.
49. "Pas En Angleterre," XXXVIII (September 10, 1949), 264-65.
50. Ibid., 265.

Crossman noted the resentment which developed in the Assembly among those who did not approve of the pressure exerted on the deliberations of the Assembly by the European Movement:

> Lastly, the Assembly, as it acquired a volonté générale, increasingly resented the European Movement's strident claims that it was running the show and began to feel a certain sympathy with Dr. Dalton's dislike of Mr. Duncan Sandys.[51]

Crossman indicated that by the last week of the Assembly it was clear to all present that "the obstacle to European Union is not British Socialism but Britain, . . . [and] Mr. Churchill and Mr. Morrison are merely two personifications of Britain's age-old determination to keep a foot in every camp."[52]

Maurice Edelman, also in The New Statesman and Nation, took up the attack on the European Movement with these truculent remarks:

> The European Movement . . . can claim to be the only pressure-group in the world with a flag. Green and white, it hangs in every street with almost the same incidence as the European Movement's own managers, lobbiers, secretaries and hangers-on in the Coulisses of the Assembly.
>
> But though most delegates do not want the Consultative Assembly to become an extension of the European Movement, the Movement, enlarged by Churchill's prestige, has members in each national delegation, and is able to bring powerful influence to bear on any matter considered by the Assembly.[53]

Another incident, as Harold Butler indicated in The Fortnightly "justly or unjustly . . . raised doubts as to British good faith and the genuineness of the professions of some British delegates at Stras-

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51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. "The Consultative Assembly at Work," XXXVIII (August 20, 1949), 188.

bourg"--especially the Labour Government's delegates. This was the decision to devalue the pound, taken in Washington before the close of the Assembly at Strasbourg.[54] This action seemed to many European delegates of the Assembly to threaten the work they were trying to accomplish at Strasbourg. The New Statesman and Nation pointed out that the only alternative for the British Government was rapid exhaustion of dollar reserves and large-scale unemployment.[55]

Because of his early advocacy of European union at Fulton, Zurich and The Hague Conference, and because of his prestige in the European Movement, Churchill held a special position in the eyes of Continental unionists at the 1949 Session of the Consultative Assembly. Churchill clearly appeared to use his prestige within the European Movement to carry his opposition of the Labour Government in the House of Commons onto the floor of the Consultative Assembly at Strasbourg. Nevertheless, Churchill and the Conservative delegation were able to appear as champions of unity and to defend the Assembly's "rights" against the Committee of Ministers, while the Labour delegation received the reprobation of other delegations at Strasbourg and of the world press alike.

Maurice Edelman aptly summed up the situation in International Affairs:

> The British Labour Delegation found a rather hostile public at Strasbourg in 1949, not only among their fellow delegates but also in the world press represented there. The delegates at the incipient Consultative Assembly were, for

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54. "Strasbourg and After," CLXIII (November, 1949), 300.

55. "After the Deluge," IXXVIII (September 24, 1949), 319.

> the most part, devoted to the federal conception of a united Europe--a conception which had a sympathetic world press. The odium which attached itself to the British Government, and to the Labour Delegation last year, rested entirely on the fact that we were not prepared to say that a united Europe could only be achieved by means of federal solution. Rather coyly the Conservative Delegation did not state specifically in 1949, as it was to do late in 1950, that it was not a supporter of a federal solution in Europe. . . . The Conservative Delegation . . . was thought if not to favour, at least not to be hostile to a federal solution for Europe. The Labour Delegation, on the other hand, which declared specifically at an early stage that it was not in favour of a federal constitution, became the target of considerable political attack--not only in Strasbourg, but also at home. The difference, as it seemed, between the federal and functional approach was not then as well understood in Britain as it is today. And the Conservative attitude was, if not equivocal, at least obscure.[56]

The heyday of Opposition was soon to fade, but while it could the Conservative Party continued to harass responsible Government for its caution towards the projected European union.

Reaction in the House of Commons to Disposal of Assembly's Recommendations by Committee of Ministers

In its second meeting, held in Paris on November 3, 1949, after adjournment of the Assembly, the Committee of Ministers gave great impetus to the conflict between it and the Assembly when the Ministers refused to approve any of the amendments to the Statute which the Assembly had proposed. Most of the Assembly's Recommendations were ignored, shelved or referred to other agencies for further study. The Ministers did grant the Assembly control over its agenda "so long as subjects placed on the Agenda fall within the scope of the Council of Europe as defined by the Statute,[57] and it was also agreed that Germany should

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56. "The Council of Europe 1950," XXVII (January, 1951), 25-26.

57. International Organization, IV (1950), 150.

be invited into the Council as an Associate Member.

This action by the Committee of Ministers gave the Opposition in the House of Commons another opportunity to criticize Labour Government "obstructionism". The debate which ensued on the Council of Europe did much to clarify the attitude of both parties towards European union.

In the House of Commons on March 22, 1950, Conservative MP E. Hynd asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs "what action had been taken by His Majesty's Government . . . to implement the recommendations of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe."[58] Foreign Secretary Bevin reminded Hynd that only those Recommendations which the Committee of Ministers transmitted to Member Governments need be considered. Those recommended for consideration by the Ministers included social security, human rights and the question of a European passport. His Majesty's Government, Bevin announced, had referred these matters to experts for study.[59]

The fact that the Committee of Ministers had scuttled all but three of the Assembly's Recommendations gave the Opposition Leader a marvelous opportunity to remind the Government in the House on March 28, 1950 that much of the Western World was accusing Britain of "dragging her feet" when it came to European union:

> It is widely thought on the Continent and in America that the British Government are lacking in zeal for the whole plan—"dragging their feet" is, I believe, the American expression. It is said that on the Committee of Ministers the Foreign

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58. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CDLXXII (1950), 1954.

59. Ibid.

> Secretary is always amongst those who wish to advance less far and less fast. That is what is widely believed and it tends to weaken our general influence in Europe.
>
> I have one more observation to make about the Consultative Assembly. Substantial results flowed from that Assembly at Strasbourg last year. But the contrast between the activities of the Assembly and the apparent inaction of the Committee of Ministers, has created the impression that the Ministers are not wholehearted in their intention to promote the Union of Europe. . . .[60]

Maurice Edelman most successfully countered this threat by pointing out that coordination or integration in Western Europe could be achieved only by the general consent of all the countries concerned. He thought that Britain did not wish "at this stage" to relinquish any sovereignty to a supra-national authority which would "be able to dictate to us in this country what we should do."[61] He also pointed out that the Labour Government had to deal with the problem of union in a gradual, realistic and practical way. To set up some "ideal pattern" which could not be achieved would, Edelman contended, harm more than it would help plans for Western European union.[62]

In the same debate, Robert Boothby, Conservative MP, attributed the disillusionment which resulted from the failure of the "high hopes engendered at Strasbourg" not to the intransigence of Mr. Bevin and the Labour Government, but to "the continuing disagreement between ourselves and the United States of America about the future economic organisation of the western world."[63]

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60. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s DCLXXIII (1950), 197.

61. Ibid., 245.

62. Ibid., 244-45.

63. Ibid., 262-63.

Renewal of the Conflict between Ministers and Assembly in the 1950 Session

Prior to the convening of the 1950 Session of the Consultative Assembly, the Joint Committee met on August 5, 1950. During this meeting, Spaak's complaint that the Committee of Ministers was reducing "the Assembly to a role of futility, and was disregarding European public opinion" set off anew the conflict between the two main organs of the Council of Europe.[64]

The 1950 Session of the Assembly opened in Strasbourg on August 7th. The presence of representatives from the two new associate Members, Germany and the Saar, and Iceland, as a full Member, brought the Council's membership to fifteen countries.[65]

A modernistic, temporary building, designed to last ten years, had been erected in five months to house the Council of Europe.[66] By the time the second session of the Assembly adjourned, some observers might have realized that the dream which had inspired this "House of Europe" was dead. It might echo the wranglings of European statesmen for nine more years, but it might have to stand a hundred years or more before it would serve the purpose for which so many had thought it was constructed. A House where the representatives of the United States of Europe would meet and formulate legislation for a United Europe was far

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64. International Organization, IV (1950), 691.

65. Ibid.

66. Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly (2d session), Reports Part I (Strasbourg: 1950), I, 34.

from realization.

The 1950 Session of the Assembly met amidst demonstrations of European students, who showed their enthusiasm for the abolition of European boundaries by burning border check stations, tearing down barricades, and marching on the Strasbourg Assembly to demand European union.[67] The spirit of these demonstrators was greatly dampened by Spaak's disparaging address to them urging moderation, caution and a gradual approach to the many and most difficult problems facing the delegates in the new "House of Europe".[68]

In a speech on the Report of the Committee of Ministers to the Assembly, André Philip of France epitomized the disappointment and disgust of the majority of the representatives with the Ministers' disposal of the Assembly's 1949 Recommendations. Categorically and unequivocally, Philip launched a vitriolic attack upon the Ministers for sabotaging the aim of the Council to create a closer unity among the European nations. He laid full blame upon the Ministers for the Council's inability to accomplish anything and then denounced the Ministers for not granting the increases in power for which the Assembly had asked.[69]

The Statute provided that the Assembly should meet once a year and each session should not be longer than a month, unless the Committee

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67. Carleton, op. cit., 179.

68. Harold Butler, "Strasbourg in Retrospect," The Fortnightly, CLXXV (February, 1951), 74.

69. Reports Part I (2d session), I, 29.

of Ministers should approve an extension of time.[70] The Assembly had asked to be allowed to hold each session in two meetings several months apart. This was not granted, but the 1950 Session met in two parts by its own decision. Committees of the Assembly, except the Standing and Joint Committees, were to meet only between sessions of the Assembly and at Strasbourg. Philip pointed out that these committees had taken it upon themselves to meet when and where necessary and "the Committee of Ministers bowed at last before the inevitable."[71]

Philip was caustic in his comments on the Ministers' disposal of the Assembly's Recommendations. The question of a European passport, he remarked, "was referred to Governments for study," and the proposals concerning patents "have been submitted to experts." "Are we going to be able to increase our power?" queried Philip.

> For a year now we have accepted compromises and half-measure for the sake of unanimity. . . . The result has been that nothing has been done. Now, if nothing were done at this Assembly, if we were to disappoint the hopes placed in us by our peoples, this second Session would certainly be the last, because nobody would have any more interest in our doings and our words.[72]

Most speakers in the debate on the Report of the Ministers expressed similar views.[73] Most felt that the cause of European unity

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70. Article 32; International Organization, III (1949), 589.

71. Reports Part I (2d session), I, 29.

72. Ibid., 29-33.

73. Edelman, Labour delegate: "From the point of view of rallying our resources, no one can say that the work of the Council of Europe during the past year has been an unqualified success. Indeed, out of its work not a single new European institution has emerged, not even a postage stamp." Ibid., 25.

had been sabotaged by the Ministers in refusing to grant additional powers to the Assembly, in forbidding changes in the Statute, and in scuttling Assembly Recommendations by the effective parliamentary

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Edberg of Sweden, referring to the conflict between the Ministers and the Assembly: "To-day it is difficult to escape the feeling that the Council of Europe has reached a critical stage." Ibid., 34.

Kapani of Turkey: "I must say that I regard the Report of the Committee of Ministers as being very second-rate. It neither justifies nor confirms the hopes placed in the Committee." Ibid., 43.

British Conservative delegate Boothby: "Last year we met here in a spirit of faith, hope and confidence. We thought we were going to achieve a great thing—the Union of Europe. Our hopes, Mr. President, have not been realized. Europe is not yet united. We have achieved nothing during the last twelve months except a number of Reports. I do not know who has read these Reports, but one thing is quite clear—they have not been read by the Committee of Ministers." Ibid., 44.

"Mr. President," began Bidault of France in his speech on the debate, "the Committee of Ministers can hardly have expected to be welcomed in this hall by a chorus of praise." Ibid., 46.

More truculent than Bidault was delegate Serrarens from the Netherlands: "The wretched game of hide-and-seek that the Ministers have been playing with the Assembly and its Standing Committee is unworthy of the Council of Europe." Ibid., 49.

Reynaud of France was more cutting than his colleague Bidault: "It is perfectly obvious that there is a divorce between the Committee of Ministers and the Assembly. The Assembly is almost unanimously anxious to get on with the building of Europe, whereas, to judge by its action, the Committee of Ministers would appear to be hostile to the whole idea." Ibid., 63.

Three notable exceptions to those who attacked the Committee of Ministers were: Mackay, Labour delegate, Ibid., 81; Ohlin of Sweden, Ibid., 88; and Eichler of Germany, Ibid., 75. These three indicated that failure lay not with the Committee of Ministers, but with the Council of Europe and its Statute.

legerdemain referred to by Philip. The 1950 Session of the Assembly clearly met in an atmosphere of real crisis.

Conservative versus Labour Delegates in the 1950 Session--the Question of a European Army

The atmosphere of crisis was heightened by the Korean War which had begun in June 1950. The Committee of Ministers in their Report and Message to the Assembly had asked it to take some action supporting the United Nations' action in Korea. This Recommendation opened the way for Churchill and the Conservative delegates to circumvent Article One, (d) of the Council's Statute which prohibited Assembly discussion of matters relating to national defense.[74] In the debate on the Ministers' Report on August 11th, Churchill proposed a motion calling for the creation of a European Army. Reminding the delegates of their limitations and their duties, he said:

> We in this Assembly have no responsibility or executive power, but we are bound to give our warning and our counsel. There must be created, and in the shortest possible time, a real defensive front in Europe. . . .
>
> I beg to move that: "The Assembly, in order to express its devotion to the maintenance of peace and its resolve to sustain the action of the Security Council of the United Nations in defence of peaceful peoples against aggression, calls for the immediate creation of a unified European Army subject to proper European democratic control and acting in full co-operation with the United States and Canada.[75]

Mr. Mitchison, Labour delegate, immediately reminded the President, the Assembly and Churchill that his motion was out of order, since subjects

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74. International Organization, III (1940), 584.

75. Reports Part I (2d session), I, 123-24.

relating to national defense were excluded from discussion by the Statute.[76]

With this action the feud between the Labour and the Conservative delegates began anew. Hugh Dalton, Labour delegate, explained that since he had no idea what new organs might have to be created to achieve "proper European democratic control" of the proposed European Army, and, since defense matters were already being considered within the framework of the Atlantic Treaty Organization, he would abstain from voting on the Churchill motion.[77] Spaak, the President of the Assembly, stated that since the Ministers had asked the Assembly to take action supporting the United Nations' action in Korea, he felt the motion was admissible.[78] A vote was taken by a show of hands and the motion was considered valid in light of the Ministers' Recommendation for Assembly action.[79] The motion was amended to read: "unified European Army under the authority of a European Minister for Defence."[80] It was adopted by a vote of eighty-seven to five with twenty-seven abstentions.[81] The abstentions were by British Labour and Scandinavian delegates. Continental delegates from France,[82] the Netherlands,[83] Germany,[84] Italy,[85] and

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76. Ibid., 124.
77. Ibid., 141.
78. Ibid., 158.
79. Ibid., 159.
80. Ibid., 155.
81. Ibid., 165.
82. Ibid., 147.
83. Ibid., 158.
84. Ibid., 159.
85. Ibid., 124.

Greece[86] supported the motion.

Five months earlier in the House of Commons on March 16, 1950, Churchill had called for a liberated Germany to take part in Western defense.[87] Two weeks later on March 28, 1950, defending himself against an accusation by the Prime Minister of "irresponsibility" in advocating the rearming of Germany, Churchill claimed he had been misunderstood. He did not, he said, advocate the re-armament of Germany or the re-creation of the German Army, but stated he could see no reason why the Germans should not contribute to the defense of their country and Western Europe.[88] Now, with his motion for the creation of a European Army accepted by the Consultative Assembly, Churchill's plan was well advanced. It regarded European union as a primary step to bring Germany back into the brotherhood of Western European nations and to strengthen the defenses of Western Europe against the Communist threat.[89]

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86. Ibid., 131.

87. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CDLXXII (1950), 1288.

88. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CDLXXIII (1950), 191.

89. See Churchill's speech in the 1949 Session of the Assembly calling for the admission of Germany as a Member of the Council, this chapter page 65.

On September 14, 1950, in a speech in the House of Commons, Anthony Eden said: "But we should also agree that the whole purpose of any modification of that Statute [the Occupational Statute which formed the basis for the German Federal Republic], as well as the efforts of my right hon. Friend at The Hague and at Strasbourg, has been to draw Germany into the European family of free and democratic nations. . . .

If I carry the House with me, it is merely a development of our own actions that Germany should be associated in the defence of the free nations. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CDLXXVIII (1950), 1382.

While most Conservatives, including Eden, had supported Churchill's advocacy of a German contribution to Western defense, Labour MP's had opposed this Conservative "irresponsibility". Ernest Bevin, speaking for the Government in the House on March 28th stated:

> I have been asked to submit that the whole purpose of our policy should be the winning of Germany for the West. This raises the question of the arming of Germany. All of us are against it. I repeat, all of us are against it. It is a frightful decision to take.[90]

R. H. S. Crossman, speaking for about a third of the Labour Party, but not for the Government, went further than Bevin:

> Let us be quite clear that if we re-arm the Germans we are consolidating the Russian control of Eastern Europe because the patriots in Eastern Europe will fight the Germans every time, even if it means siding with Russia. . . .
>
> I believe that this country should keep to its long-term European policy. Its long-term European policy is to achieve unification of Germany and its neutralisation in a peace treaty with the Russians. . . . Unify Germany, disarm Germany, neutralise her and guarantee her against aggression from both sides, and then all Eastern Europe and Western Europe are very likely to be happy and united. Arm her and we make the unity of Europe impossible.[91]

As earlier at home in the House of Commons where the question of Germany and European defense furnished a main issue for the Opposition, so in the Consultative Assembly the Labour and Conservative delegates again divided on this issue. But in the Council of Europe, the Conservatives were less forthright in their advocacy of a German contribution to European Defense than they had been in the House of Commons. With this advocacy of a European Army, Churchill introduced into this greatly

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90. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CDLXXIII (1950), 324.

91. Ibid., 279-90.

harassed and divided Council another of the great problems which increased friction and conflict there.

Although the Korean War prompted torrents of verbiage in the House of Commons and in the Consultative Assembly, Robert Boothby, Conservative delegate, succinctly expressed the impotence of the Council in matters of defense.

> Do not let us be under any illusion as to the state of our defences. For all practical purposes they are still non-existent. There has been a lot of talk about the Brussels Pact and the Atlantic Pact; but the only visible result of these Pacts, to date, is a number of committees, and in a straight fight between tanks and committees tanks are apt to win. . . .
>
> The truth is that our failure in the field of defence is as complete as it is elsewhere.[92]

The Labour delegates received support from Scandinavian Socialists, the Irish delegation, and, also, from the German delegates Gerstenmaier[93] and Schmid,[94] who opposed German re-armament. But the Assembly approved Churchill's motion for "a European Army under a European Defence Minister." When the Committee of Ministers met at Rome November 4, 1950, prior to the second part of the 1950 Assembly Session, and refused to discuss the Recommendation of the Assembly for a European Army, tension between the two bodies reached new heights. The Ministers justified their action on the ground that defense matters were outside the realm of the Assembly, and that since these matters were being dealt with by the Governments in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, further

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92. Reports Part I (2d session), I, 45.

93. Ibid., 72.

94. Ibid., 85.

duplication of effort was unnecessary.[95]

Federalism versus Functionalism

The question of Federalism versus functionalism had been raised in the debate on the Ministers' Report in the first part of the 1950 Session. This touchy problem was aggravated by discussion of the Schuman Plan in the Assembly. This Plan, calling for international control of the production and distribution of coal and steel by a high authority, had been promulgated by Schuman at a Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris on May 9, 1950.[96] The British Labour Government opposed the Plan because it provided for a supra-national agency (the High Authority) which would administer it. In a pamphlet entitled European Unity, published in June 1950, the Labour Party expressed reluctance to join any continental movements or schemes for federal union in Europe which would include Great Britain, or any plans which would require Great Britain to relinquish any national sovereignty to a supra-national agency not responsible to the electorate.[97]

John Strachey, Secretary for War, reiterated the Labour Government view a fortnight later in a speech at Clochester, July 1, 1950. He announced his Government's opposition to the Schuman Plan and upheld its decision not to take part in the Paris talks on the Schuman proposal. In the following week, in the House of Commons, the Opposition

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95. International Organisation, V (1951), 216.

96. Reports Part I (2d session), I, 94.

97. "Mr. Attlee's Dilemma," The Spectator (London), CLXXXIV (June 23, 1950), 844-45.

challenged this speech and the Government decision not to be represented at the Paris talks.[98]

As a result of the British Government's refusal to take part in the Paris talks on the Plan, Schuman was invited, upon the recommendation of the Committee of Ministers, to present the French proposal in the Assembly on August 10, 1950. After Schuman's speech, Dr. Dalton reiterated the British refusal to join in any schemes of federation or to relinquish any sovereignty to a supra-national authority. Dalton told the Assembly that Great Britain would not oppose the Schuman Plan, and he promised that Britain would "always stand ready to co-operate, to consult and to study any proposals with great sympathy."[99] He wished those who wanted "to lead the federal road" good luck:

> But many of us--the British Representatives of all parties and many Scandinavians and, I think, some others--will not take the federal road. . . . It is clear that in Scandinavia, as in Britain, we do not wish at this stage in history to tread this federal road. We believe that the same end can be achieved by other methods of closer co-operation.[100]

Nor did Dalton speak only for the Labour Party on the question of federation. He correctly claimed to express the views of the Conservative Party as well. "On this question of the federal approach," he said, "the British Labour and the British Conservative Representatives are one."[101]

One of the French delegates, Paul Reynaud, was greatly disturbed

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98. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CDLVII (1950), 630-34.

99. Reports Part I (2d session), I, 136.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

by Dalton's words and by Scandinavian acquiescence to the British viewpoint. He commented sadly: "At this pathetic moment in the history of Europe, the cry has been heard: 'Go your own way! We and the British will go ours!'"[102]

The conflict between the functionalist and federalist approach to union was settled in favor of the functionalists in the second part of the 1950 Session in November, but not before the cause of European union had received a series of staggering blows in the November debate in the British House of Commons

Dalton's claim that he spoke for the Conservatives as well as for Labour was not refuted by Conservative delegates nor by Churchill himself. Churchill, continuing in his role as champion of Assembly "rights," promised to take the Assembly's Recommendations directly to the British Parliament by using "the facilities at the disposal of the British official Opposition," if the Ministers continued to refuse to pass on the Recommendations of the Assembly to their Parliaments.[103] He also urged other delegates of Opposition parties in the Assembly to do the same thing in their Parliaments, "until the obstructive influences on the Committee of Ministers have been overcome or have disappeared."[104]

Yet this same speech, for the first time in the Assembly, revealed Churchill's hesitancy towards the federal approach to union—a position

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102. Ibid., 159.

103. Ibid., 121.

104. Ibid.

not unlike that of the Labour delegates.

> There are other points of difference which may well be re-adjusted as a result of our discussions. I have always thought that the process of building up a European Parliament must be gradual and that it should roll forward on a tide of facts, events and impulses rather than by elaborate constitution-making. . . .
>
> We are not making a machine. We are growing a living plant.[105]

House of Commons Debate on Council of Europe Clarifies British Position

If doubt still lingered as to the Conservative position in regard to federation, that doubt should have been dispelled after the general debate which took place in the House of Commons in the second week of November 1950.[106] Before the General Debate on the Council of Europe took place in the House, Herbert Morrison, Labour MP, asked Churchill how long he believed it would take for Parliament to consider the fifty-one resolutions passed by the Assembly in the first half of its 1950 Session. "I would say to the right hon. Gentleman," Morrison chided, "that he should be a little careful at Strasbourg not to give sweeping assurances as to what he will do out of Opposition."[107]

Ernest Davies, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, opened the Commons debate on the Council of Europe on November 13, 1950. En-

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105. Ibid.

106. This debate took place after the Committee of Ministers had again refused to take seriously the Recommendations of the Assembly. Meeting in Rome on November 4th, the Ministers, while approving the Convention on Human Rights which the Assembly had referred to it, refused even to discuss the Assembly's Recommendation for a European Army. International Organization, V (1951), 216.

107. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CDLXXI (1950), 306-307.

equivocally, Davies presented the Labour Government's attitude toward the Council of Europe. He indicated that the Council was not conceived, nor was it ever considered by the Labour Government, as a parliament with any legislative powers. It was to be "a forum of European opinion . . . a forcing house of ideas which could be taken into account by Governments through the Committee of Foreign Ministers. . . . It was not designed as an executive authority which imposes its will upon Governments."[108] He complained that certain members in various delegations used the Assembly as an organ of opposition through which they attacked their home Governments. "They took the opportunity of exporting their home squabbles to the Continent, and by so doing I think it is fair to say that there was some retardation of European co-operation and unity rather than advancement."[109] Answering charges that the Labour Government had been unenthusiastic towards the Council, Davies said that his Government had followed a "realistic approach" toward European cooperation.[110] He stated that the Opposition Leader emphasized "the defensive and the political aspects of European co-operation" while the Foreign Secretary concentrated "on the economic aspects."[111] Referring to Churchill's call in the Assembly for a European Army with a European Minister of Defense, Davies reminded the House that Britain was not exclusively a European nation, but that she had interests and obligations

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108. Ibid., 1392.

109. Ibid., 1393.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., 1395.

elsewhere in the world.[112] As a final thrust at the Opposition for their actions at Strasbourg, Davies reminded the House that matters of defense did not come within the scope of the Council of Europe, and that the Ministers were simply abiding by the Statute when they refused to consider the Assembly's Recommendation for a European Army.[113] Davies suggested that "the presence of so many opposition leaders at the Consultative Assembly does not make for Harmony."[114] Then he accused the European Movement of abetting the conflict between the main organs of the Council. He thought that the European Movement, by supporting the cause of federation, was encouraging the Council in a direction which was never envisaged by its Statute.[115] His Majesty's Government, Davies asserted, had never accepted the federal approach to union, nor had this concept been acceptable "to a large number of hon. Members opposite, though some of the Opposition have expressed their desire to see it develop in that direction."[116] Davies should have destroyed once and for all the illusions of most Continental federalists when he said:

> Federation can only mean the creation of a supra-national authority for Europe, and no British Government could possibly commit themselves in advance ever to accept the majority recommendation of such a body.[117]

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112. Ibid., 1396-97.

113. Ibid., 1399.

114. Ibid., 1401

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid., 1402, [Italics added].

This was the reason why the Labour Government had refused to take part in the Paris talks on the Schuman Plan held in June, July and August of 1950.[118] In due time, the Conservative Government would advance essentially this same argument when it succeeded to office in 1951, in explanation for its refusal to join the Schuman Plan, to support the proposed Pleven Plan for a European Army, or to enter into closer cooperation with other European nations within the Council of Europe.

Concluding, Davies once more reaffirmed the Labour Government's support of the Council of Europe, but this support was for the Council as originally conceived, not as it aspired to become. He reiterated that Committee of Ministers should be "an organ of inter-governmental co-operation" and the Assembly should be "an opinion-making body" and "a forum of discussion." Then, Davies added:

> His Majesty's Government desire to assist [the Council of Europe] in its development in this direction, but must continue to oppose any attempt to convert the Assembly into a Parliamentary body and the Committee of Ministers into an executive responsible to it.[119]

In regard to defense, Davies pointed out that this was being considered by the North Atlantic Treaty countries, and that "the greater includes the less."[120]

The Labour Government's position was again clearly stated, as it had been during the 1949 Session of the Assembly. The Assembly could

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118. Reports Part I (2d session), I, 234.

119. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CDLXXI (1950), 1407.

120. Ibid., 1408.

either function within the limits of its Statute and the framework provided, or it would be opposed by the Labour Government. It was not to be a European Parliament with legislative powers, nor was it right for Opposition parties to use the Council as a pillory to harrass responsible Governments at home.

Duncan Sandys, Churchill's son-in-law and the main spokesman for the Conservatives and for the European Movement in the Council of Europe, countered for the Opposition with a denial that any of the Opposition had "seriously recommended that a federal system should be instituted in Europe and that we should join [sic] it. . . . What we have done," asserted Sandys, "is to recommend an alternative method, the functional approach. This involves no federal constitution and no irrevocable transfer of sovereign powers."[121] Like Davies, he pointed out that "there is no question either of the Assembly being a supra-national Parliament. We have never suggested that."[122] Like Davies, he claimed that the Assembly should be the "focus for European opinion."[123] Sandys did differ from Davies on one important point. He was sorry to hear that the Government opposed Churchill's motion for a European Army. On that subject he added:

> The proposal for the creation of a unified European Army was undoubtedly the most important recommendation which the European Assembly has made since it came into being.[124]

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121. Ibid., 1410.

122. Ibid., 1411.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid., 1415.

Sandys asked the Government to re-consider the question of a European Army and added that some German participation would be necessary if either a European Army or a defense force within the Atlantic Community were to be successful.[125]

Except with respect to the proposal for a European Army, the position of Davies and Sandys were so nearly indistinguishable that the rest of the debate had little effect, unless it was, as Tom Williams suggested in The New Statesman and Nation, to wound the Council of Europe.

> Those who expected a great occasion on the Debate on the Council of Europe—and the galleries were full—must have been greatly disappointed. It had all the promise of drama—a tense international situation abroad [the Korean War] and violent party disagreement at home. But of drama there was none. Half an hour after its beginning, I was convinced that there could be nothing on earth duller than the Council of Europe reviewed by Ernest Davies. In yet another half-hour, I knew there was. Duncan Sandys on the same subject. . . . Maxwell Fyfe tried hard to save the Debate for the wide issues of human right, but succeeded only in so overloading the current, that he blew all his own fuses. It was left to Ernest Bevin finally to kill the Debate. The Council of Europe was sorely wounded that day in the house of its friends.[126]

Several Labour MP's professed amazement at what they considered to be a complete reversal of the Conservative position on the question of federalism versus functionalism. Glenvil Hall exclaimed:

> I listened with some astonishment to the speech of the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys). It appears to me that he has gone back completely on almost everything he said at Strasbourg. I was under the impression until this afternoon that he was a keen federalist. He now informs us that he never was one and that he, in common with other

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125. Ibid., 1422.

126. "Parliament: From Freedom to Sausages," XL (November 18, 1950), 446.

> Members on the benches opposite, believes in the functional approach.[127]

Hall was right. The Conservatives had been talking out of their other hat at Strasbourg. Some wit complained "It was getting hard to tell which hat they were talking through."[128] With respect to the proposed European Army, Hall expressed amazement at "how utterly irresponsible some of the representatives who go to Strasbourg can be."[129] He thought that if the Council of Europe ceased to exist "it will cease because its friends have killed it."[130]

Robert Boothby, Conservative delegate to the Assembly, had favored federation, the relinquishment of sovereignty and a European Army with a German contribution. Now, speaking as an MP, he said:

> From a practical point of view the Council of Europe has achieved precisely nothing, with the single exception of the Charter of Human Rights. The Committee of Ministers is powerless, and the Assembly is an academic and disillusioned debating society.[131]

He attacked the Government for "spinning a spider's web of committees all over Western Europe,"[132] and he concluded that "Europe is in danger of being smothered by the multiplicity of organisms set up to keep her alive."[133] Boothby even suggested that the chance to form a European

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127. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CDLXXX (1950), 1423.

128. Kenneth Lindsay, "Challenge to the West," The Fortnightly, CLXXX (September, 1953), 155.

129. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CDLXXX (1950), 1425.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid., 1431.

132. Ibid., 1434.

133. Ibid., 1435.

union had been lost and that Europe's only hope lay in the Western Union of the Atlantic Pact.[134]

Sir Herbert Williams, Conservative MP, remarked: "I should not shed any tears if the Council of Europe never met again."[135] Perhaps Tom Williams' comment that "the Council of Europe was sorely wounded that day in the house of its friends" should have omitted the final phrase.

Maurice Edelman, who had so often perceived truth missed by others, expressed his faith in the Council of Europe: "The great achievement of the Council of Europe is that it exists."[136] Reviewing the 1949 Session of the Assembly he shrewdly evaluated the Conservative tactics:

> The Conservative representatives were full in those days of ambiguous reticences. . . . They sat silent. They allowed continental representatives to cherish the view, which they held for over a year, that hon. Gentlemen opposite were in favour of the federal settlement which they were sponsoring.[137]

Like Davies, Edelman explained that while the Labour Government opposed federation, it was not opposed to those countries on the Continent who favored it. The British Government, he stated, would look upon such a federation "with benevolent neutrality."[138]

Concluding the debate, Ernest Bevin reassured the Conservatives for carrying domestic disputes into the Council of Europe.[139] He placed

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134. Ibid., 1436.

135. Ibid., 1458.

136. Ibid., 1471.

137. Ibid., 1472.

138. Ibid., 1478.

139. Ibid., 1500.

full responsibility upon the European Movement for the conflict between the Ministers and the Assembly.[140] Bevin then piqued Churchill beyond the great man's endurance when he said:

> We have had some trouble from this so-called European Movement, not always in the open, I am afraid, and it has been extremely difficult to carry on negotiations with the kind of semi-sabotage going on behind.[141]

Churchill responded, "You are the arch saboteur."[142] The Foreign Secretary concluded with a reminder that matters relating to European Defense were being considered by the Atlantic Pact Powers. As Davies had said, so Bevin reiterated, "the greater must absorb the less."[143]

This debate in the House of Commons revealed, as had those in the Consultative Assembly, that regardless of the verbiage from both sides, the position of the two British parties was very similar. Even on the question of a European Army the position of the two parties was not entirely dissimilar. The day following the debate on the Council of Europe (November 14, 1950) Minister of Defense Shinwell stated in reply to a question that the Government was committed to a European Army within the framework of NATO with a German contribution to such European defense.[144] The difference was that the Conservatives did not restrict their proposal for a European Army to the framework of NATO, and the provision for a European Defense Minister implied a supra-national

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140. Ibid., 1501.

141. Ibid., 1502.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid., 1504.

144. Ibid., 1727-31.

authority to which the Army would be responsible. Time would reveal that the Conservative Government opposed this as vehemently as had the Labour Government.

In the 1950 Assembly debate on the Schuman Plan, the Conservative Party had revealed its opposition to any form of supra-national authority.[145] Yet both in the House of Commons and in the Assembly, the Conservatives continued to censure the Labour Government for refusal to take part in the Paris talks on the Schuman Plan.[146] Finally, on August 15th, Conservative delegate Harold Macmillan, speaking in the Assembly, appeared to embrace the position on the Schuman Plan taken by the Labour Government from the outset in May:

> One thing is certain, and we may as well face it. Our people will not hand over to any supra-national Authority the right to close down our pits and our steelworks. We will not allow any supra-national Authority to put large numbers of our people out of work in Durham, in the Midlands, in South Wales or in Scotland.[147]

Thus even on this important issue, the Conservative and Labour lines were similar. In the second part of the 1950 Session, which convened on November 16th, the question of functionalism versus federalism was decided officially. As Hugh Dalton had indicated in debate on the Schuman Plan during the first half of the 1950 Session; as the debates in the House of Commons on the Council of Europe in early November had revealed; and as the debate which preceded the vote on the question of federation and functionalism in the second half of the 1950 Session

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145. Reports Part I (2d session), I, 187-258.

146. Ibid., 234.

147. Ibid., 230.

later proved; there was little difference between the Conservative and Labour delegates' position.

Functionalism Wins

As has been indicated, when the Committee of Ministers met at Rome on November 4, 1950, they treated the Assembly's fifty-one Recommendations with indifference. The Ministers flatly refused to consider the Assembly's Recommendation regarding a European Army.[148] The Convention on Human Rights which the Ministers did sign was, according to delegates in the Assembly, a greatly emasculated version of the one proposed by the Assembly.[149] When the second part of the Assembly convened on November 18, 1950, delegates were infuriated by the Ministers' action, and a feeling of defeat and pessimism prevailed in the debates.

Amidst general consternation at cavalier treatment of Recommendations by the Ministers, a French delegate, Teitgen, blamed the British Labour Government for ministerial emasculation of the Convention on Human Rights. He pointed out that by eliminating the provisions guaranteeing the right to own property, the right of parents to have the choice with regard to the education of their children, and the right to hold free elections, the Ministers had greatly reduced the guarantee of fundamental freedom which it was the purpose of the Charter to insure to citizens in all Member countries.[150] Labour delegates Mitchi-

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148. International Organisation, V (1951), 216.

149. Reports Part III (2d session), III, 680-88.

150. Ibid., 680.

son[151] and Callaghan,[152] sought to refute Teitgen's charge. Lord Layton, joining their cause, stated: "I regard the Convention watered down as it is, as a most important landmark in European history."[153]

The question of functionalism versus federalism was finally settled in this week-long November meeting of the 1950 Session. The November debate in the House of Commons had revealed that there was essentially no difference between the two British parties on this question. The federalists, consisting of large numbers in the delegations of most continental countries except Scandinavia, were in favor of drafting a constitution for a united Europe of Federal States and calling for immediate popular elections to choose representatives for an all-European Parliament. The functionists, mainly British and Scandinavian delegates, favored a more gradual method which called for international cooperation through specialized agencies created by general agreement on the governmental level. The General Affairs Committee recommended to the Assembly that European unity should proceed by the establishment of specialised authorities to be set up in areas to be agreed upon by the Governments of Member countries. The Assembly, in accepting this recommendation, by a vote of eighty-two to nine with sixteen abstentions, chose the functional approach to union.[154]

Continental Federalists were right in regarding this defeat as

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151. Ibid., 688-89.

152. Ibid., 693-94.

153. Ibid., 696.

154. Ibid., 856.

the death of their aspirations for an immediate European Parliament. They were also right in placing the blame for the defeat upon the British. In particular the British Labour Government received the odium of these disillusioned Federalists, but as has been indicated, the Conservative delegates regarded federation with as much skepticism and disfavor as the Labour delegates. However, being out of office, the Conservatives were in a much better position to exploit the situation. Although many Continental Federalists hoped for more British cooperation, if and when the Conservatives came back into power, this was quite unrealistic in light of the Conservative position in both the House of Commons and in the Consultative Assembly on the vital issues of federalism and the Schuman Plan. Truly, the Conservative position, as events in 1951 and 1952 would prove was as insular and "obstructive" as that of the Labour Government had been in 1949 and 1950.

In February 1951, three months after the last meeting of the 1950 Session had adjourned, Sir Harold Butler suggested in The Fortnightly how greatly the functionalist victory had destroyed the chances for European unity:

> But though some progress was made with the mechanism which the "functional approach" might be realized in practice, except in the field of human rights no concrete proposals emerged. . . . In other words, "functionalism" is still almost as much an abstraction and ideal as "federalism".[155]

Maurice Edelman effectively summed up two years of Labour and Conservative policy when he wrote in December 1950:

> The frank consistency of the Labour representatives at Strasbourg, even when it meant unpopularity last year, won

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155. "Strasbourg in Retrospect," CLXXV (February, 1951), 74.

> for them, this year, an approval denied to the Conservatives, whose leaders' record . . . has been one of ambiguous reticence and equivocation. Macmillan's moving <u>Grenole</u> cannot compensate, in the eyes of his Continental colleagues, for his "unsatisfactory" attitude toward the Schuman Plan and his present coolness towards Federalism.[156]

The attitude of both British parties in the dispute on federalism versus functionalism and on the Schuman Plan revealed a clear pattern. "With respect to European integration the United Kingdom is steadily hostile to any interference with the processes of parliamentary government as its people know them."[157] This hostility was further revealed by the attitude of the Conservative Party after it came to power in October 1951. There were many reasons for this British attitude.

In 1951 and 1952, Conservative policies in the Council of Europe disappointed many Continental advocates of union who expected a Conservative Government to be more sympathetic toward Continental aspirations for a European federation. In the light of Conservative policy in the Consultative Assembly, these expectations were unrealistic. There was <u>one</u> British Foreign Policy. It was pursued by the Labour Government in 1949 and 1950. It was pursued by the Conservative Government in 1951 and 1952. To the disappointment of Continental unionists there was to be little difference between the delaying "obstructionism" of the Labour Government and the distant "patronage" of the Conservative Government.

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156. "Rough Love at Strasbourg," <u>The New Statesman and Nation</u>, XL (December 2, 1950), 536.

157. Alsada Comstock, "Great Britain: Functional Preferred," <u>Current History</u> XX (January, 1951), 10.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 1951-1952: CONTINUITY OF BRITISH POLICY

The First Part of the 1951 Session--Obfuscation, Apathy and Economic Problems

By the time the 1951 Session of the Consultative Assembly convened on May 5th, the great issues debated in the first two sessions had crystallized. The British position, despite Conservative obfuscation, had been made clear. Plainly stated it was this: Regardless of plans of other Member countries, Great Britain would not join a European federation, nor would she participate directly in any specialized agency which was controlled by a supra-national authority. If other countries agreed to relinquish sovereignty to a supra-national agency or to federate, Great Britain would maintain a benevolent neutrality and would cooperate with such groups in so far as it was practical. This was the attitude not only of the British Government, but of the Conservative Party as well.

Despite the fact that the British position had been clarified, Conservative utterances in the first part of the 1951 Session continued to give hope to Continental unionists who desired closer British cooperation, if not direct participation, in a European union. These hopes were not without foundation. In the May sittings of the 1951 Session, Duncan Sandys, the chief Conservative spokesman in the Assembly, had congratulated the six Governments on their signature of the Schuman

Plan Treaty. He also expressed regret that his own country had remained outside the Schuman Plan discussions.[1] Later in the same session, Harold Macmillan, another important Conservative, reiterated these same views.[2] Lord Layton, Liberal delegate and Conservative fellow-traveler, not only stated that Britain should have taken part in the Paris talks on the Schuman Plan, but that she "should enter into negotiations with a view to coming into the Community as a full member."[3] Again Duncan Sandys gave further hope to Continentals who desired closer British cooperation when he called upon the Assembly to "examine what action, in our opinion, should be taken by our Governments together in order to strengthen the prospects of peace and accelerate the progress of European and Atlantic re-armament."[4] The question of European defense was one that the Labour delegates still held to be outside the Statute and not, therefore, to be discussed in the Assembly.

In light of what Conservative delegates had said in opposition to the Labour Government's policies toward European union, it was not

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1. Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly (3d session), Official Report of Debates Part I (Strasbourg: 1951), I, 32. In 1951 the title of the Assembly's debates was changed from Reports to Official Report of Debates.

2. Ibid., 203.

3. Ibid., II, 238.

4. Ibid., II, 294.

5. Alternate Fletcher, substituting for Mr. Blyton, Labour delegate, stated in the fourteenth sitting of the May 1951 Session, "that the framers of the Statute of the Council of Europe were wise in their decision to try to exclude matters on defence from our consideration."
Ibid., II, 350.

entirely unreasonable for Continental delegates in the Assembly to expect a more favorable attitude toward union if the Conservatives came back into power. Despite attempts of Labour delegates to expose this Conservative "patronage" of union as mere political bombast, Continental unionists eagerly awaited a Conservative victory at the polls.

To a great extent the conflict between the Committee of Ministers and the Assembly had lessened.[6] This easing of tension was due partly to the increases in power granted to the Assembly by the Committee of Ministers. The Committee of Ministers met on March 16-17, 1951, and again on May 2d, prior to the 1951 Session of the Assembly. British and Scandinavian ministers opposed any modification of the Statute which would turn the Assembly into a European Parliament, and the Assembly wish for permission to deal with defense matters was rejected. Also, the Ministers again renounced any immediate aspirations towards political unity and approved a report restricting the Assembly's actions in its third session to intergovernmental cooperation or the functional approach to union. The Ministers did however agree to modify Article One of the Statute to include political matters among those the Assembly would be competent to discuss, and to allow discussion of questions of security and to abandon entirely their right to control the agenda of the Assembly. They also approved the Assembly's Recommendation

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6. In a Report from the Committee of Ministers to the Assembly, delivered on May 10, 1951, Mr. Stikker, Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, stated: "Compared with previous Sessions, I have a very real and gratifying feeling that the relations between the Committee of Ministers and the Assembly have considerably improved."
Ibid., I, 174.

that Germany should be promoted from an associate to a full Member in the Council of Europe.[7]

These actions by the Ministers did ameliorate, to some extent, the friction between the two bodies. Two other factors contributed to this lessening of tension. Economic problems arising from the Korean War and from attempts to increase production for defense, largely occupied the delegates in the 1951 Session. Moreover, debates on political issues seemed apathetic, as many delegates expressed the view that the cause of European union was lost with the victory of functionalism in November 1950.

Some delegates spoke of past failure of the Council of Europe, yet held out hope that some concrete contribution to European unity could be achieved in this third session. Swedish delegate Edberg said that since nothing could be achieved along constitutional lines the Assembly must turn its energies towards "immediate and practical tasks."[8] Delegate Klompe of the Netherlands felt that the Assembly should not "throw in its hand," but it "must insist on its Recommendations and the revision of the Statute must remain on our Agenda."[9]

On the other hand, some delegates spoke of the failure of the Council and wondered if it were even worth the time to attend the Assembly's meetings. Mackay, Labour delegate and one of the staunchest supporters of union, undoubtedly spoke for many when he said:

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7. International Organization, V (1951), 396, 624.

8. Official Report of Debates Part I (3d session), I, 34.

9. Ibid., 4.

> We are getting lulled into a sense of complacency, and have been so for the last two years, as a result of which we are achieving very little in the eyes of the people of Western Europe, and . . . the Council, which could be an effective body, still has to show whether it is capable of doing anything effective at all. I shall not hide from the Assembly that I came back on this occasion with the utmost hesitancy as to whether it was worth coming at all.[10]

Reporting for the Committee on General Affairs, delegate Struye of Belgium made reference to the indifference which was exhibited toward the Council of Europe:

> The first conclusion on which your Committee seems to have been unanimous is that the Council of Europe is at present passing through a crisis--a period of lassitude and, to some extent, loss of faith. The outward and visible signs can be seen in many fields; the press, which is the mirror of public opinion, and public opinion itself, are much less concerned with the work of the Council of Europe than they were two or three years ago. Our various national parliaments devote singularly little time to the activities of Strasbourg.[11]

Delegate Teitgen of France warned that if the Assembly did not succeed in endowing the Council of Europe with real powers this time "we may well despair both of Europe and of ourselves."[12]

"Despair", "lassitude" and "complacency"--these were the attitudes reflected in the speeches of many of the delegates in the 1951 Session. It was true that debate on the necessary changes in the political structure of Europe was no longer consuming the main energies of the Assembly. Instead, as Lady Tweedsmuir, Conservative delegate from the United Kingdom, pointed out: "This year we discuss how . . . to

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10. Ibid., 46.

11. Official Report of Debates Part II (3d session), III, 468.

12. Ibid., 504.

organise our joint resources all over the world."[13] Labour delegate Hoy from the United Kingdom stated that the sittings were "a little on the dull side" because the Assembly was now dealing with "practical matters".[14]

These practical matters were largely economic. As a result of the Korean War, Western European countries embarked upon increased rearmament programs. Increased defense spending was threatening to destroy the economic equilibrium which had been achieved under the Marshall Aid Program. Also, stockpiling of raw materials by the United States was forcing prices so high that European countries were not in a position to compete with the United States in the world markets. The delegates at Strasbourg favored creation of a Joint European Purchasing Board, to facilitate purchase and allocation of scarce articles needed by all Member countries for their defense programs. Such joint purchasing would tend to stabilise prices of raw materials whose inflation was threatening the economic gains achieved since the end of World War II. For the most part the May sittings of the third session in 1951 were concerned with these important economic matters.[15]

The first part of the 1951 Session adjourned May 15th, and as the British General Elections were to be held on October 25th, President Spaak of the Assembly and the Standing Committee agreed to postpone the second part of the third session until November 26, 1951.[16] European

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13. Official Report of Debates Part I (3d session), I, 96.

14. Ibid., 158.

15. Official Report of Debates Part I (3d Session), I, II.

16. International Organization, V (1951), 812.

delegates still hoped that a Conservative Government would be more favorably disposed toward European unity. It was felt that British participation in the Schuman Plan and support of the Pleven Plan for a European Army would be greatly furthered under a Conservative Government.

Hopes for British Volte Face Pave Way for Disillusionment

On September 27 to 29, 1951, prior to this election, the Consultative Assembly's Committee on General Affairs met in Paris and proposed action on the following programs: (1) to induce Britain to revise its attitude toward a wholly united Europe; (2) the economic unification of Europe with the closest possible ties with the British Commonwealth; (3) a new attempt to solve the main political problem of a European Army and of a closer link between Britain and the rest of Europe; and (4) a continued endeavor to present the united front of an integrated Europe.[17] It was hoped that these suggestions presented to a sympathetic British Government would do much to revitalize the cause of European unity.

The British General Elections were held on October 25, 1951, and Winston Churchill slipped into Downing Street on a minority vote by capturing Liberal support in some twenty-five marginal constituencies.[18] After five years of the Socialist experiment, the Conservative Party was again in power. Continental unionists of all shades and

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17. International Organization, V (1951), 812.

18. "Let's Face the Future," The New Statesman and Nation, XLII (November 3, 1951), 479.

degrees regarded the Conservative victory as a propitious omen for their sorely battered cause of European union.

After all, argued Continental advocates of closer British co-operation in European union, had not Winston Churchill offered Paul Reynaud "an indissoluble union in 1940 with a constitution which would provide for joint organs of defense, foreign, financial and economic policies?"[19] Was it not Churchill who made the first clarion call for European unity from Zurich in 1946? Was it not through the efforts of the great prophet and leader that his United Europe Movement was instrumental in convoking The Hague Conference for European Unity? Was it not under the auspices of his United Europe Movement that various national and international movements for European unity joined forces and combined their efforts in the European Movement? Was not the Council of Europe a consequence of the Zurich speech, The Hague Conference and the European Movement? Had not Churchill championed the rights of the Assembly over the Committee of Ministers? Had it not been Churchill who gallantly opposed the "obstructionism" of the British Labour Government in the Assembly of the Council of Europe? Had it not been Churchill who courageously proposed the motion calling for a European Army in the Assembly in 1950?

Churchill had done all these things. By many this great man was looked upon as the prophet, leader and champion of the cause of European union. Now, in October 1951, he headed the British Government. Despite the warnings of Labourites, both in the Assembly and in the

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19. H. G. Nicholas, "American Scrutinises European Union," The Fortnightly, CLXXIX (March, 1950), 177.

House of Commons, Continental advocates of European union expected a volte face in British policy towards the Council of Europe. They were greatly disappointed.

The British "Betrayal"

In an opening speech of the second part of the 1951 Session, the Belgium delegate Struye, reporting for the Committee on General Affairs on the Aims and Prospects of European Policy, called upon the Conservative Government for much closer British cooperation in achieving the aims of the Council and stated that "whatever we may wish and whatever we may do, Europe without Britain is only a truncated, mutilated Europe, a mere travesty of itself."[20] Guy Mollet of France also called upon the new British Government for action to further the cause of European unity.[21] The action he and the Assembly received was not that which they had expected from the new British Government.

In a speech in the Assembly on November 26, 1951, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, setting down a statement on the policy of His Majesty's Government toward the Council of Europe, stated that while "the Government of the United Kingdom desires to establish the closest possible association with the European continental community in all stages in its development"[22] its close ties with the Commonwealth and special position within the Atlantic Community made its participation in a

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20. Official Report of Debates Part II (3d session), III, 474.

21. Ibid., 495.

22. Ibid., 512.

European federation impossible.[23] Nor could the new Government take an active part in the Schuman Plan as many hoped, although His Majesty's Government "welcome/d/ the Schuman Plan as a means of strengthening the economy of Western Europe" and would, if the Schuman Plan were ratified, "set up a permanent delegation at the seat of the High Authority to enter into relations and to transact business with it."[24] Nor could the new Government promise what its eventual association with the European Defense Community would be.[25] Fyfe then continued to limit the scope of the Council of Europe's work to that of "a focus for European public opinion" and "as a forum for discussion."[26] He ended by stating that the functional approach to union should be followed and such a functional method could only progress by the conclusion of multilateral agreements on governmental level.[27]

So that there would be no mistake as to the Conservative Government's position, Liberal delegate Lord Layton reiterated, with emphasis, everything Maxwell Fyfe had said. Great Britain could not accept a constitutional federation; she could not enter into any agreement controlled by a supra-national authority like that of the Schuman Plan; if the plans for a European Army presupposed a supra-national authority, then she could not enter that plan either. Great Britain would cooperate with

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23. Ibid., 512-13.

24. Ibid., 513.

25. Ibid., 514.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 515-16.

any agencies other European countries might feel free to set up.[28]

While Continental delegates were recoiling from the shock of the Fyfe-Layton delineation of British policy toward the projected European union, Labour delegates reminded the Assembly that this had been the Labour Government's position, and that these were the oft-stated arguments which the Labour delegates had put forward for the past two years. Continental unionists had a right to be disappointed for as Glenvil Hall, Labour delegate in the Assembly, pointed out "the new Government intended to follow the policy laid down by its predecessor."[29] Where was the difference between the new Government and that of its predecessor? Indeed there was none. As John Freeman pointed out in The New Statesman and Nation, even the arguments used by Fyfe were the same put forward by the Labour Government in previous sessions of the Assembly:

> The Government's firmly stated decision that the position of Britain economically, militarily and as the hub of the Commonwealth, is basically inconsistent with a political integration into Western Europe is almost certainly a wise one. But the same arguments were put forward, and with equal validity, by Mr. Bevin and Mr. Morrison in their day. At that time the Labour Government came under the sharpest criticism from British Conservatives for its cautious, unimaginative attitude. . . .
>
> At the end of the first week of the Council's session, it is apparent that good will towards Britain has now reached a new low at Strasbourg. Angry Frenchmen are not mollified by being reminded that Mr. Churchill habitually uses extravagant language when he is not Prime Minister and that the Conservatives have never formally committed themselves to anything beyond the previous Government's position . . . .

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28. Ibid., 566-68.

29. Ibid., 553.

> The Council of Europe is, as one of its own reports puts it, "an organ seeking its natural function." While the British Conservatives were in pursuit of office, they used language which led many Europeans to believe that they would be willing to take part in providing a function. In a sense the Council has dragged on, buoyed up by this hope, waiting for the British electorate to put Mr. Churchill in the position to play his part. Now the moment of truth has arrived, and the function is seen to be less a vision than an illusion.[30]

As Freeman concluded: "This important statement [of Fyfe] shows no change from the position of the Labour Government."[31]

Among Continentals, it was Paul Reynaud of France, generally considered as Churchill's chief European acolyte,[32] who was most outspoken in his criticism of the statement of policy by the new British Government. He warned that if Britain refused to take part in the proposed European Army the French Parliament would reject the Scheme.[33] At a later time, he expressed astonishment that the Conservative Government had no intention of supporting the proposed European Army--a motion which had been proposed eighteen months before by Winston Churchill himself in the Assembly of the Council of Europe. "We can still hear," Reynaud cynically reminded the Assembly, "the echoes of the reproaches which our friends among the English Conservative Members of Parliament heaped upon their Labour colleagues with regard to the Schuman Plan."[34] Now

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30. "Outlook from Strasbourg, Part I," XLII (December 8, 1951), 657-59.

31. Ibid., 658.

32. Ibid., 659.

33. Official Report of Debates Part II (3d session), III, 519.

34. Ibid., 1040.

the Conservatives were playing the game which they had abused the Labour Government for playing.

Gordon Walker, Labour delegate, pointed out to the despairing Reynaud and the disillusioned Assembly that the British had made their position "abundantly clear":

> In a word, we have said that we will not and cannot enter into federation, whether complete or partial. We in the Labour Party have always said that; and it is quite clear now from the speeches that have been made by the Conservatives here that they are of the view and, if I may say so, it will be even more clear from their votes than it was from their speeches.[35]

That was true. Regardless of what Conservative delegates might say, they had voted against federation; they had voted against British participation in the Schuman Plan; and they later voted against participation in the European Defense Community.

Indeed there was reason for despair in the House of Europe. hope of closer British cooperation in Europe in the event of a Conservative victory at the polls helped to sustain the Council of Europe during two years of sterile wrangling.[36] This hope was dashed to the ground by Eyfe's statement of policy given on behalf of the new British Government.

Reaction to Conservative Statement of Policy

Referring to the Conservative policies in the second part of the 1951 Session of the Assembly, John Freeman epitomized the view of many when he stated:

> The idea of European Union, of which the Council of Europe is the expression, gained widespread acceptance, at least on

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35. Ibid., 1054.

36. Paul-Henri Spaak, United Nations World, VII (April, 1953), 18.

> the Continent, largely as the result of Winston Churchill's rhetoric when out of office. The first month of Mr. Churchill's Government may have been enough to kill it.[37]

Arthur N. Holcombe, in 1953, noted the disappointment of Continental unionists and the damage done Churchill's reputation as a "good European" by the Conservative Party's inability to live up to expectations.

> Leading Continental advocates of European Union were greatly disappointed when the British Labour Government, then in power, was unwilling to cooperate in establishing as powerful an organization at Strasbourg as they desired . . . . Later, when Churchill returned to power at Westminster, high hopes were formed of the help to be received from him in strengthening the Council of Europe and making it better able to accomplish the purpose of its creators. But these hopes were disappointed and Churchill's credit among European Unionists was badly damaged.[38]

The most dramatic response to the new British Government's statement of policy toward the Council of Europe came with the resignation of Paul-Henri Spaak from the Presidency of the Consultative Assembly. Spaak had been elected three times in as many years to the Presidency of the Assembly. In a letter to the Assembly, read in the fortieth sitting on December 11, 1951, Spaak stated that for some time he had been "very uneasy in the Presidential Chair," and that he "suffered more and more from . . . [his] inability to take a really active part in our work," and finally he could not "in all conscience approve the unenterprising policy of the Assembly."[39] Many delegates expressed deep regret at the

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37. The New Statesman and Nation, XLII (December 8, 1951), 659.

38. Op. cit., 420.

39. Official Report of Debates Part II (3d session), IV, 1091-92.

loss of such a forceful and fair-minded President.

In a brilliant speech on the same day, Spaak lashed out at the Council for its inability to accomplish anything and promised "to support any Motion which will enable the Council of Europe to emerge from the period of negative policy and stagnation into which it has entered."[40] In his opinion there were in the Assembly "not more than sixty Representatives who really believe in the need for a united Europe."[41] Addressing the British delegates, he continued:

> Of course, we must again point out to them--and I apologise for doing so--that we came here with a certain amount of hope. We thought that the political change which had taken place in Britain would provide us with a new opportunity of closer cooperation. We anxiously awaited what the Conservative Government representatives were going to tell us, and we also impatiently awaited what the Labour representatives, who had now become the Opposition, were going to confide to us.
>
> You have never been--and I say this to your credit--more categorical and definite in your statements, in telling us that, while fully appreciating what a united Europe meant to us, you would never follow us along this road or along these lines!
>
> I say this not without a certain amount of disappointment and bitterness, but in no way, in a vindictive spirit. These statements that we were waiting for, on which we had counted and in which we had placed some of our hopes did not come to pass; we ought then to have been courageous enough to face up to the hiard fact confronting us.[42]

Spaak then insisted that the Assembly must not allow the British position to be its excuse for not continuing to strive for the cause of European unity. He charged the Assembly of dying of its own discretion

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40. Ibid., 1108.

41. Ibid., 1109.

42. Ibid., 1110.

and ended with the following appraisal of the Assembly:

> To-day, whether we like it or not, interest in the cause of a united Europe no longer lies, I am sorry to say, within this Assembly. Those who wish to continue along the road we have followed in the past few years now realise that the prospects here have become almost hopeless, that we must look beyond these walls and that it is again by having recourse to propaganda and by rousing public opinion, showing it what the real position is and how it can save itself if it wishes to avoid disaster, that the real solution to the problem will be found.[43]

From the moment of his resignation, Spaak became an outspoken critic of the Council of Europe and of British policy toward it. Churchill as the head of a responsible Government no longer championed the cause of European unity. Since December 1951, its cause has been courageously championed by Paul-Henri Spaak.[44]

Possibly in 1951 Spaak would have agreed with Michael Straight who wrote that Britain had joined "the Council of Europe principally to prevent its development along federal lines."[45] So might Continental unionists, so greatly disappointed with the new British Government's stand, have agreed. Their hopes for closer British cooperation in the Council of Europe had been "betrayed". They were sorely disillusioned.

Whatever the reason for Britain's joining the Council, federalist aspirations were completely frustrated. But regardless of the hopes which Continentals had gleaned from two years of Conservative equivo-

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43. Ibid., 1112.

44. "Strasbourg and Luxembourg," The Economist, CLXIV (September 20, 1952), 671.

45. "Europe the Battleground, Part III," The New Republic, CXXV (September 24, 1951), 14.

cation and ambiguity in the Assembly, their expectations were decidedly unrealistic.

The new British Government, like its predecessor, was greatly criticised for its stand in the Council of Europe. Much of this criticism originated in the United States. On May 12, 1951, the Consultative Assembly passed a motion to invite members of both Houses of the United States Congress to take part in a general meeting with representatives of the Strasbourg Assembly in November, a week before the convening of the second part of the 1951 Session.[46] When these fourteen United States representatives met with the Assembly delegation in Strasbourg, they were outspoken in their criticism of the apathy of the Council of Europe and in particular criticized the British for "dragging their feet."[47]

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, speaking at Columbia University on January 11, 1952, defended the British policies in the Council of Europe from the new Government's many critics:

> The American and British people should each understand the strong points in the other's national character. If you drive a nation to adopt procedures which run counter to its instincts, you weaken and may destroy the motive force of its action. This is not something you would wish to do . . . to an ally on whose effective cooperation we depend.

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46. Official Report of Debates Part II (3d session), III, 476.

47. See U.S. Congress, Senate, The Union of Europe: its Progress, Problems, Prospects, and Place in the Western World, Report of the Meetings Between a Delegation Appointed by the United States Congress as Authorized by S. Con. Res. 36 and Representatives Appointed by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, November 1951, 82d Congress, 2d Sess., Document No. 90, January 21, 1952 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952) pp. 4-19.

> You will realize that I am speaking of the frequent suggestions that the United Kingdom should join a federation on the Continent of Europe. This is something which we know in our bones we cannot do. We know that if we were to attempt it, we should relax the springs of our action in the Western Democratic cause and in the Atlantic association which is the expression of the cause. For Britain's story and her interests lie far beyond the Continent of Europe.[48]

Speaking at Ottawa on January 14, 1952, Churchill made the same point clear--Britain would not become a part of a federated Europe. He reiterated Britain's desire to cooperate in Europe, and then he emphasized that Britain would cooperate closely with the United States in the projected Atlantic Community.

> We require to do all in our power to promote a united Europe and the design of a European army, including Germany.
>
> I have long been an advocate of both these ideas. We shall do all in our power to help them to success. That does not mean that Great Britain will become a unit in a federated Europe, nor that her army, already in line upon the Continent, and to grow steadily, will be merged in such a way as to lose its identity. We stand with the United States, shoulder to shoulder with the European army and its German element, under the supreme NATO Commander to face whatever aggression may fall upon us.[49]

The British Policy of Conservons le Chose--

The Eden Plan

In an attempt to counteract European disillusionment with the new Conservative Government after the Pyfe November address in the Assembly and, also, to quell increasing American criticism of British policy toward the project of European unity, Anthony Eden announced

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48. New York Times, January 12, 1952, p. 4.

49. New York Times, January 15, 1952, p. 1.

the so-called "Eden Plan" to the world in the next Committee of Ministers meeting held at Paris on March 19-20, 1952.

The Eden Plan contained two main points. First, it was a British initiative to strengthen the Council of Europe by insuring that agencies like the Schuman Plan and the proposed European Defense Community would develop within the structure of the Council of Europe. Secondly, it was an expression of the British desire to create organic links between Great Britain and the Continental communities which were being proposed.

By June 1952, the parliaments of six countries[50] had ratified the Schuman Plan. In May 1952, the same six had signed the treaty for the European Defense Community. There was some fear that the establishment of "Little Europe", as this group was called, would further split Europe instead of unifying it. It was generally felt in the Assembly that the Eden proposals for close cooperation between these new communities and the existing organization of the Council of Europe would do much to prevent this split. Some felt that the Eden Plan was a Machiavellian device on the part of Britain "to secure the harlot's privilege of power without responsibility."[51] Others felt it was a British attempt to "delay negotiations among the six countries."[52] Conservative delegate Nutting tried to explain the British Government's reasons for the Eden proposals:

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50. France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries. Official Report of Debates Part I (4th session), I, 77.

51. Ibid., II, 148.

52. Ibid., I, 103.

> The movement for unity in Europe, which led to the creation of this Council of Europe, is now flowing along two main streams. One stream is the Atlantic Community, a wide association of States which, without formal surrender of sovereignty, is achieving unity of purpose and action under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The other stream is the European Community, a small group of States, which is moving towards political federation by the progressive establishment of organisations exercising supra-national powers in limited fields.
>
> The Council of Europe seems to me to be in danger of becoming stranded between these two streams. This would surely be as disastrous as it really is unnecessary . . . . Now is the time to create the proper link between the Council of Europe and the European Community which is taking shape.
>
> By bringing Strasbourg into focus with the Community, we can open up the possibility of close and effective relationship between the members of the Community and the other countries represented here. But more than that, we can, I believe, strengthen the whole fabric of Western Europe and bring about the greatest possible unity among all its component parts.[53]

This, Nutting indicated, did not necessitate the merging of the Schuman Plan and the European Defense Community with the Council of Europe, but the Council would be the framework within which these supra-national agencies could operate. The Eden Plan left the exact relationship and degree of coordination between these various agencies to be worked out as experience and need dictated.[54]

Conservative delegate Lady Tweedsmuir thought it was a mistake for the six nations to federate outside the aegis of the Council of Europe. Such a federation, she argued, would weaken the necessity for the Council and would serve only to further divide Europe.[55]

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53. Ibid., I, 90.

54. Ibid., I, 93.

55. Ibid., I, 127.

Paul Reynaud of France attacked the English position. "To be or not to be" in Europe—that was the British dilemma. The British must make up their minds where they stand, Reynaud insisted. They had told Europeans to go ahead with their union; now that the Europeans had done so, Britain was afraid, Reynaud contended, lest she lose her special position on the Continent. Now with the Eden Plan she hoped to establish close organic links with her European neighbors without becoming a full member in the union.[56] Britain wanted as Spaak put it, to be "not partners, but associates" with her European neighbors.[57]

During the May part of the 1952 Session, the Eden Plan was hotly debated in the Assembly. In the second part of the same session, held September 15-30, 1952, Anthony Eden came to Strasbourg to reiterate the basic issue of his plan.

> Briefly, it is this: that all European restricted Communities, such as the Coal and Steel Community, which require Ministerial or Parliamentary institutions, should draw upon the facilities existing here in the Council of Europe. In other words, that they should make use, as far as is compatible with their own smaller membership, of the Ministerial and Parliamentary machinery which you have evolved here. This is the idea in its simplest terms. . . .
>
> These proposals are flexible. They do not attempt to lay down rigid lines on which the relationship between the Council of Europe and the Communities should develop. Our object was to suggest the means, and promote the actions, by which the two main trends towards European unity, the supranational and the intergovernmental, could be linked together. We did not expect immediate or spectacular results.[58]

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56. Ibid., II, 167-172.

57. Ibid., II, 178.

58. Official Report of Debates Part II (4th session), III, 281-82.

The Coal and Steel Treaty came into force on August 10, 1952, and in line with the Eden Plan the United Kingdom sent a large delegation to the High Authority in Luxembourg.[59] Thus a new phase in British cooperation on the European continent was inaugurated.

Labour delegate Robens considered the Eden Plan as "a logical outcome of the foreign policy pursued by the late Mr. Ernest Bevin, who did so much for the movement for European unity, and of the action of the Labour Government and the Labour delegation at Strasbourg from the beginning."[60] On the other hand, delegate Jakobsen of Denmark commented:

> The Eden Plan gives, in my opinion, no cause for exultation; it is no great idea solving all our difficulties. I would rather call it a sad realisation of a sad fact. But it is always wise to realise facts, even when they are sad, and it is a fact that we cannot to-day go any further than the Eden Plan proposes if we are to keep together.[61]

It was true. The Eden Plan did propose links between those countries which favored entering into supra-national agencies and those which wanted only to be associated with these special groupings. But, as the failure of the French to ratify the European Defense Community Treaty revealed, a union involving French national security needed British participation if it were to succeed. As long as Britain would only "associate" herself with such communities European union would remain at an impasse.

Britain felt that the federation of the Six would "drive a wedge between the United Kingdom and Europe."[62] Was it to be a question

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59. Ibid., 299.

60. Official Report of Debates Part I (4th session), II, 165.

61. Ibid., I, 102.

62. Official Report of Debates Part II (4th session), V, 684.

of six nations versus the remaining nine outside the Coal and Steel Authority? The Eden Plan was an attempt to prevent this split between the Member countries of the Council of Europe. It was also at attempt to define the extent of British cooperation with European countries which sought European unity by creating and joining supra-national bodies. This split in the Council of Europe gave Britain and other European countries an additional reason for increasing the emphasis upon the Atlantic union with the United States and Canada.[63] The defeat of the European Defense Treaty and, as Eden indicated in the Assembly in September 1952, the lessening of the danger of "an aggression against Europe"[64] did as much as the Eden Plan to end the threat that the Council of Europe would be divided between the six Schuman Plan countries and the remaining nine who did not wish to join the Coal and Steel Authority.[65]

Britain would not join any supra-national authority, but the Eden Plan pledged her to a close cooperation and association with such communities as would be established. That was the British position at

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63. Ibid., 687.

64. Ibid., III, 283.

65. Mario Einaudi indicated in The Yale Review, September, 1953, that since Stalin's death there has been a gradual lessening of tension in Europe and as a result the impelling force--the threat of Communist encroachment into Western Europe--which drove European countries toward unity had slackened considerably. As a result, Einaudi contended, many felt that "the limited federative efforts of the six Schuman Plan countries /were/ precipitate and unwise." "Europe After Stalin," XLIII (September, 1953), 31.

the end of 1952, and it has not changed appreciably since the Eden Plan was first promulgated in March 1952. It demonstrated again a historic fact, that Britain was, and would remain, both a European and a world power. Unfortunately for the cause of European union, her policy would be determined first by her overseas commitments and relationships; European responsibilities would be secondary. Only during time of war, or when war threatened, would European responsibilities come first.

As Robens suggested, if the Labour Government had been in power in 1952, there undoubtedly would have been a "Morrison Plan" or some equivalent for the Eden Plan. This is only further evidence that British foreign policy is not determined by the party in power, but by factors which are relatively constant and exert, within a limited range, relatively the same pressure on whichever Government is in power.

CHAPTER V

FACTORS SHAPING BRITISH POLICY TOWARD EUROPEAN UNION AND CONCLUSIONS

There were many reasons why the British Government, whether Labour or Conservative, would not join any federation or participate in any continental schemes which required the relinquishment of national sovereignty to some supra-national authority. These reasons had been put forward by the Labour Government in 1949 and 1950; the same reasons were put forward by the Conservative Government in 1951. Of these, the most important, and most often advanced, were: Great Britain's ties with the Commonwealth of Nations and Empire, the fact that she was the center of the sterling bloc of nations with her currency serving approximately forty per cent of the world's trade,[1] and her special position within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with her close relationship with the United States. Other factors which contributed to Britain's hesitancy to assume added responsibilities in Europe were: a long history of insularity, a desire to protect her Socialistic experiment from continental radicalism on one hand and from extreme laissez-faire on the other,[2] and strong nationalistic pride which made the relinquishment or pooling of sovereignty unpopular with the British electorate.

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1. Derk Uipko Stikker, "Western European Unity," Vital Speeches of the Day, XVI (March 1, 1950), 363.

2. "Britain and European Federation," The Round Table, XLII (June, 1952), 214.

The Commonwealth-Sterling Bloc Argument

Before the Council of Europe was a reality, as early as May 1948, Prime Minister Attlee, speaking in the House of Commons, reminded the House that his Government put Commonwealth considerations before Western union.

> Undoubtedly we need a Western Union and our agreements in the West, but this country cannot apply itself solely to one continent. . . .
>
> In advocating Western Union, we are prepared with other Powers to pool some degree of authority. . . . We would most heartily agree with the idea that underlies the Motion of federation of Western Europe and ultimately of the world. We are not prepared to call a Constituent Assembly right off. I do not believe that that is the way to work towards what we want. I believe that we shall get it far better by the practical steps which are being taken now, not forgetting that we work all the time with the Commonwealth. I was disturbed by the suggestion in the Motion that we might somehow get closer to Europe than to our Commonwealth. The Commonwealth nations are our closest friends. While I want to get as close as we can with the other nations, we have to bear in mind that we are not solely a European Power but a member of a great Commonwealth and Empire.[3]

This view was shared by the Conservative Party. Anthony Eden, speaking in the House of Commons on the same day as Attlee, May 5, 1948, stated:

> For us in this House as a whole the welfare of the Commonwealth and Empire must always be the first consideration. . . .
>
> I am anxious that the closest possible relationship should be established between ourselves and the other nations of Western Europe, but there is one condition to such progress which must be absolute, and it is that the Empire is with us in the conception and the execution of that plan at every state.[4]

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3. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CDL (1948), 1315-19.

4. Ibid., 1271-73.

Dr. Dark Stikker, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, pointed out in a speech in New York City in March, 1950, that Britain's dual position as a European power and also as the center of a great Commonwealth of Nations made it difficult for her to accept new commitments on the continent of Europe.

> On one hand Britain has strong historical, cultural, economic, and geographical ties with the continent of western Europe which makes her anxious to occupy her rightful place in the European community, but on the other she has equally strong affinities outside Europe which render new commitments, especially when these may have far-reaching consequences, a matter of very serious consideration.[5]

The Commonwealth argument had been put forward time after time by the Labour delegates in defending their refusal to support a European federation or to enter the Schuman Plan. In the second part of the 1951 Assembly Session, the Conservatives offered this same Commonwealth argument to justify their refusal to enter the Schuman Plan or to guarantee British participation in the proposed European Army. Speaking in the last week of the 1951 Session, Conservative delegate Hopkinson stated the case plainly:

> As has been said so often in this Hall, Britain is not only a European country, she is also the head of a great Commonwealth and Empire. In addition, she is a leading element in the Sterling Area. The defence of sterling must always be a major objective for the British Government, for, if we failed in this matter the results would be disastrous not only to the United Kingdom but also to all the countries which depend on sterling and, finally, for Western Europe as a whole.[6]

Clear as Commonwealth ties appeared to be, leading British

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5. Op. cit., 363.

6. Official Report of Debates (3d session), IV, 785.

spokesmen may have given foundation for European Federalists' hopes that these ties were not incompatible with British participation in some Western European union. In January, 1948, Winston Churchill told the House of Commons that "this European policy of unity can perfectly well be reconciled with and adjusted to our obligations to the Commonwealth and Empire of which we are the heart and centre."[7] Comments of Conservative delegates in the Consultative Assembly in 1951 gave evidence that the head of a responsible Conservative Government had evidently changed his mind. Excuse or not, the Conservatives found the Commonwealth argument an expedient means of justifying their cautious policy toward the Council of Europe. Some Labour Government members also shared this view. Speaking in the House of Commons in May, 1948, Foreign Secretary Bevin had emphasized that, while his Government would "do nothing to jeopardise the already existing framework of . . . the British Commonwealth . . . we are convinced that the new structure we are building up in Western Europe will be stronger if it is closely connected with the great territories and countries overseas."[8] Even Commonwealth nations sometimes expressed this belief. Ruth C. Lawson pointed out that in 1949 Commonwealth members at Colombo indicated there was " 'nothing incompatible' between British participation in western Europe and the maintenance of traditional Commonwealth ties."[9]

On the other hand, Alzada Comstock wrote in January, 1951, that

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7. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s CDXLVI (1948), 554-55.

8. Ibid., 1115.

9. Op. cit., 332.

"Continentals are all too ready to ignore or deride the United Kingdom's Commonwealth commitments."[10] This writer contended that since these commitments covered the greatest share of the world's daily business, they were substantial and that the argument was basically sound. After all, Great Britain was the guardian of the gold and dollar reserves in all the Commonwealth countries and in all the Empire, except Canada, which was in the dollar bloc.[11] Another British observer, writing in The Round Table, claimed that if Britain joined a European Federation she would cease to exist as a sovereign state and thus all ties and connections with her Dominions would automatically be severed.[12]

Because it would affect them in different ways, Nicholas Mansergh pointed out, dominions and colonies would have different views concerning British participation in European union. Most dominions and colonies feared that in such a union Great Britain might become too closely associated with Europe to the detriment of dominion and colonial interests. For example, if Europe were to receive a priority claim on British materials and resources, dominion and colonial interests, being second, might suffer seriously. "The long-term question," Mansergh stated, ". . . that deserves the consideration of Empire Statesmen is the extent to which Britain can . . . co-operate in Western Union whilst retaining a sufficient margin of resources and freedom of action to

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10. Op. cit., 9.

11. Ibid.

12. "British Commonwealth and Western Union," XXXVIII (June, 1948), 638.

maintain effective leadership in the Commonwealth overseas."[13]

This question was answered by the Conservative Government with Sir David Maxwell Fyfe's speech in November, 1951, and the Eden Plan in March, 1952. The present British Government could cooperate no more in European union than had the previous British Government. If continentals needed reasons for this British attitude, the best was that Britain was not solely a European power; she had extensive overseas commitments to the British Commonwealth and Empire and the Sterling bloc.

Continentals should have realized, as T. E. Utley pointed out in The Fortnightly, that "the Conservative Party is the traditional friend of the Commonwealth and of the policy, not indeed of isolation but of what may be called 'semi-detachment' from the Continent."[14] Moreover, as Utley noted, the leader of that party has always been an Americanophile.[15] This might have accounted to some extent, for the increased emphasis which the Conservatives put upon the British Government's special relationship with the United States in the Atlantic Community as a deterrent to their closer cooperation with European countries with the Council of Europe.

The NATO-United States Agreement

Since his Fulton speech, Churchill had advocated full cooperation with the United States in combatting the Communist menace.[16] The

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13. "Britain, the Commonwealth and Western Union," International Affairs, XXIV (July, 1948), 304.

14. "The Schuman Plan," CLXXIV (July, 1950), 4.

15. Ibid., 5.

16. Reviewing weaknesses of the Council of Europe in 1953, Professor Holcombe of Harvard University stated that Churchill began to lose interest in the experiment at Strasbourg as the threat of

North Atlantic Treaty, signed by twelve countries on April 4, 1949, developed largely as a response to the Communist threat. From the fall of 1951 onward the attitude of the British Government, the Labour Government as well as the Conservative, revealed a decided emphasis away from European unity in favor of the union of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Alasada Comstock commented in Current History that "British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin has been less explicit than some of his critics have wished in stating his obvious preference for the Atlantic Community."[17] In September 1951, Herbert Morrison, who had succeeded to the office of Foreign Secretary upon the death of Ernest Bevin in April, wrote:

> Our foreign policy must be directed towards two objectives which go hand in hand--freedom and security on the one hand, and economic prosperity and social justice on the other. . . .
>
> The first task of the Atlantic Treaty Powers must be to ensure the Security of Western Europe. But the security of Western Europe cannot be safeguarded on the mainland of Western Europe alone. The inclusions in the North Atlantic Treaty of the United States and Canada, as well as of Norway, Denmark, and Iceland is proof enough of that.
>
> The Government will also of course continue to play their full part in the Council of Europe at Strasbourg.[18]

Churchill himself had begun to lose interest in the cause he had championed for over four years. After his proposal for the creation of a

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Communism became more menacing. This was during the Korean War in 1950 and 1951. Holcombe claimed that at this time Churchill turned his attention towards the security offered by the strengthening of the Atlantic Community within NATO.
Op. cit., 422-423.

17. Op. cit., 8.

18. "Objectives of Britain's Foreign Policy," Labor and Industry in Britain, IX (September, 1951), 105-106.

European Army in the Assembly in March, 1950, he did not attend any more of the Assembly's meetings. He was too busy with British elections and his endeavors to achieve within NATO the security which could not be achieved within the Council of Europe. "The new British Government," wrote Holcombe, "was manifestly more interested in the development of a European Army under the NATO, and was not disposed to become involved in the efforts by Continental statesmen to transform the Council of Europe into a genuine federal union."[19] Jane Perry Clark Carey pointed out that "by the spring of 1950 the idea of an Atlantic Community in which both Canada and the United States would participate had come to be regarded as the only safeguard for Western Europe and the only possible kind of Western union."[20]

There can be no doubt that after 1950 many in the British Government generally felt that more could be achieved along the lines of Western union through NATO than in the Council of Europe. This was largely due to the fact that Britain was determined to remain outside of any agreements which demanded a surrender of sovereignty, and to the fact that France, fearing a European union would be dominated by Germany[21] if Britain refused to take part, insisted that projects for union must provide for supra-national authorities in order to equalize the position of France with Germany within the projected union. Politically, one of the main objectives for the establishment of the Council of

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19. Op. cit., 424.

20. Op. cit., 71.

21. Frederick Schuman, Current History, XXI (October, 1951), 207.

Europe had been to bring Western Germany back into the community of Western European nations.[22] This it had done, but it had not succeeded in eradicating traditional French fears regarding her eastern neighbor. It was also true that Churchill's Government, as had the Labour Government before him, put more emphasis upon the unity of the Atlantic Community than that which might have been achieved in the Council of Europe.

This Conservative emphasis upon the Atlantic Community was amply evidenced by Fyfe's speech in the Assembly in November 1951. Maxwell Fyfe devoted no less than four paragraphs of his speech to the British relations with the United States and Canada within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.[23] He emphasized the fact, as the Labour delegates before him had, that the British Government had entered "a solemn undertaking to work for collective security through the organs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."[24] Conservative delegate Amery, in the last days of the November part of the 1951 Session, also referred to Britain's close relationships with the United States as an inhibiting factor to closer British cooperation in European union.

> I will not dwell upon all the reasons that have led us to adopt this attitude--the reason arising from our position as a member of the Commonwealth and from our special relations with the United States. The Assembly is already only too familiar with them.[25]

Delegates in the Assembly had heard these arguments again and

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22. Robert Schuman, op. cit., 352.

23. Official Report of Debates Part II (3d session), IV, 512-13.

24. Ibid., 513.

25. Ibid., 1021-22.

again. They were first put forth by spokesmen for the Labour Government, then by spokesmen for the Conservative Government. But regardless of what Britain's critics said, Britain's Commonwealth ties along with her guardianship of the Sterling bloc and her special relationship with the NATO Powers, were the main reasons for her refusal to enter into closer cooperation with continental Members of the Council of Europe.

Other Factors Inhibiting British Participation in European Union

British insularity, if not an outright block to further cooperation in Europe, at least inhibited it. To the British "the Europeans on the continent are still foreigners,"[26] and they have preferred to unite with English-speaking peoples across the oceans rather than with their foreign neighbors across the English Channel. This so-called "Channel Complex" has always contributed to a feeling of deep isolation from the peoples on the Continent. Add to this the jealousy of the British Labour Government which sought from 1945 to 1951 to protect its Socialistic experiment from unsympathetic elements on the European continent and the result has been an insularity enshrined in post-war Britain.[27] The New Statesman and Nation admitted in 1949 that "the almost universal belief outside our shores that it is British insularity that is the chief obstacle to Western Union is not a malignant fiction of

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26. "What Blocks Europe's Unity?", United Nations World, VI (January, 1952), 8.

27. "Lord Woolton: The Man Behind Churchill," United Nations World, IV (February, 1950), 19.

foreign Anglo-phobes."[28] In September 1953, The Fortnightly announced that "the time has come for Britain to over-come the 'Channel Complex' and give the leadership, which is deeply desired by every European." The article then concluded: "But no less important is the realisation that only within an Atlantic framework can the grand strategy of the free world take shape."[29]

Indeed insularity has played its part in the reluctance of Britishers to take the lead which many advocates of European union insisted it was their duty to accept. But more important than insularity was, and is, the great strength of nationalistic feeling in Great Britain. The vested interests of the national state have determined the policy of the British Government towards European union. This has been true not only of Great Britain, but also of the other European nation-states. The powerful cohesive qualities of a common territory, history, language and culture plus mystical ties of race, heritage and religion all combine to perpetuate the nation-state as it is known today. Even though men realize that nationalism and the existence of many independent sovereign states is a mathematical formula for recurring, internecine wars, they are reluctant to part with their sovereign right to destroy themselves. European union might be a solution to the problem, but Europeans, as well as Englishmen, have been hesitant to part with their sovereignty. Unable to apply a remedy, they must be willing to die of

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28. "The Fault, Dear Bevin. . .," XXXVII (January 29, 1949), 95.

29. Kenneth Lindsay, "Challenge to the West," CLXXX (September, 1953), 199.

the disease. As Paul-Henri Spaak said:

> National feelings are still extremely strong in Europe. We must not forget that the people of Europe have been waging war against one another with a terrible continuity. Between 1790 and 1945 that is to say during 155 years, there were forty years of war. It is obvious that forty years left traces, bad memories, susceptibilities that are still alive.[30]

It was perhaps these traces, these bad memories, these susceptibilities that caused the European Movement for unity to falter and be lost in the sterile wranglings of the Council of Europe.

Speaking in the Assembly in 1950, Robert Boothby, Conservative delegate, attributed the British opposition to federalism to their dislike for written constitutions.[31] In the same session, Hugh Dalton, Labour delegate, stated this same reason.[32]

This may have played a part in the British reluctance to take an active part in furthering European union; however, the most important factors were: Commonwealth ties with Britain's position as guardian of the Sterling bloc of nations, her special position within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and close relationships with the United States, her insularity reinforced by the desire to protect the Socialistic experiment, and, perhaps the strongest and most basic of all, Great Britain's strong nationalistic feelings which prevented the relinquishment of her national sovereignty to an authority over which she would have no control. All were important factors shaping British policy in the Council of Europe.

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30. Vital Speeches, XVII (March 15, 1951), 324.

31. Reports Part I (2d session), I, 44.

32. Ibid., 136.

These were the factors which made British participation in European political union, if not impossible, at least unrealistic. They were as real and as valid during the Conservative Government's regime as they had been during the Labour Government's. Since these factors had not changed, it was not reasonable that the Conservative Government's policy toward union should differ essentially from the policy of the Labour Government. They were the factors which made for one British foreign policy, and not a Conservative and a Labour policy. Had it not been for the Conservative Opposition to Labour delegates when these reasons were stated in 1949 and 1950 in the Consultative Assembly, it is not likely that Continentals would have expected a volte face when the Conservative Government came to power in October 1951. This opposition had given continentals a false hope. When the moment of truth arrived, as it did with Maxwell Fyfe's statement of Conservative policy in the Assembly on November 28, 1951, the Conservative Government dealt the cause of European unity a severe blow. This "betrayal" probably did as much to impede the cause of European unity as the Labour Government's "obstructionism" had during the two previous years.

CONCLUSIONS

Perfide Albion--Jamais la vie!

A study, even one so greatly limited as this, serves to highlight certain aspects of the historical scene. First, the ancient taunt Perfide Albion can with little justification be hurled at the British for destroying, between 1949 and 1952, the chances for a European union. While the British, and particularly the Labour Government, have been heaped with the odium for obstructing and sabotaging efforts within the Council of Europe to achieve European unification, both by a world press sympathetic to the aspirations for European unity and by Continental advocates of union, it cannot be said that the British attitude toward union and her policies in the Council alone were enough to prevent European union. If other factors in Europe and the rest of the world had favored such a step, union would most likely have been achieved regardless of the British attitude. Nevertheless, it is true, the British, and again, in particular the Labour Government, have been used as the excuse, or as the scapegoat, by many who paid lip-service to the concept of union, yet realized that it was either nor practical at the time, or who opposed it for political, economic, social, psychological, nationalistic, or a combination of all these reasons.

Perhaps Britain, as Michael Straight suggested, was not the only country which joined the Council to prevent the federation of Europe.[33] Spaak, having served for three successive terms as President of the Consultative Assembly, was probably in a better position

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33. Op. cit., 14.

than any one else to evaluate the general tenor of the 132 European delegates.[34] On the day of his resignation as President of the Assembly, on December 11, 1951, Spaak belabored the Assembly with the fact that in his opinion there were "not more than sixty Representatives who really believe/d/ in the need for a united Europe."[35] In an organization whose Statute stated its primary objective was "to achieve a greater unity in Europe" with less than half of its membership favoring the cause of union, it is not surprising that so little concrete headway has been made.

Another indication of the inability of European countries to achieve union was suggested by Spaak. When addressing the Assembly in May 1952, he pointed out that the smaller European countries, expressing their reluctance to enter into EDC, were afraid of losing their "individuality" and were paradoxically "being more anxious to preserve the national character of their armies than . . . /were/ the French or the Germans."[36] The French refusal to ratify the EDC Treaty might therefore be taken as an indication of the French fear to entrust their

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34. In 1951, the apportionment of representatives was re-allocated so that small Member countries like Iceland, Luxembourg and the Saar were entitled to send three delegates apiece to the Assembly, and large Member countries like France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom were entitled to send eighteen delegates apiece. This ratio was based upon the population of Member countries.

    Other Member countries apportionment was: Turkey, ten, Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands each seven, Sweden six, Denmark and Norway each five, and Ireland four. Official Report of Debates Part II (3d session), IV, 1091.

35. Ibid., 1951.

36. Official Report of Debates Part I (4th session), II, 177.

national security to an outside authority.[37] This nationalism, expressed by the small, as well as the large, powers in the Council of Europe is probably a stronger, more powerful hindrance to European union than British policy.[38] It is true, also, as has been pointed out, that British policies have, to a large extent, been determined by this same strong force of nationalism.

Robert Boothby, in an address delivered at Chatham House in February 1952, attributed the failure of the Council partly to the Foreign Offices in the various European countries, which, "tenacious of power", seek to protect the vested national interests of their respective countries. This Boothby claimed, is true not only of Whitehall but of the Quai d' Orsay and other Foreign Offices as well.[39]

Richard Crossman, on the other hand, indicated that nations are "living organisms" and that if they were done away with freedom itself would be destroyed.

> Nations are not industrial concerns, which can be amalgamated at will in order to increase their efficiency and profit-ability. They are living organisms out of which individual freedom grows. Destroy the nation and you destroy freedom itself.[40]

Delegate Saller of France expressed a third viewpoint when he

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37. Ibid., I, 77.

38. "European unity is endangered not only by Britain's reservations, but perhaps even more so by the lack of unanimity within the individual continental nations." "What Blocks Europe's Unity?", United Nations World, VI (January, 1952), 5.

39. International Affairs, XXVIII (July, 1952), 333.

40. "Nationalism: Enemy or Ally?", Commentary, X (July, 1950), 2.

indicated to the Assembly in September 1952 that the real obstacle to union was the attitudes of European peoples themselves.

> Ladies and Gentlemen, how are we to build Europe, if the peoples withhold their consent, if the fabric which we offer them arouses an insuperable mistrust born of confusion? Are you not already aware of the extent to which traditions, habits, individual interests and mental attitudes still stand in the way of the creation of Europe.[41] /sic/

The failure of attempts on the part of groups of European nations to achieve economic integration through the creation of custom unions is further proof that nationalism, plus economic self-interest, was an obstructing force hindering union. The failure of these often-lauded economic arrangements in the realm of customs and monetary unions had been indicated time and time again in pointing out that attempts at European integration are unrealistic and destined to failure.[42] In May 1952, Labour delegate Healey reminded the Assembly that "popular resistance to the consequences of the ideas of Governments" had brought the movements for the Benelux Customs Union and the Franco-Italian Customs Union "to a full stop."[43] If it is not easy for European Governments to put intergovernmental agreements within limited areas into effect because such arrangements endanger vested interests in their respective countries, it can be realized that this type of economic

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41. Official Report of Debates Part II (4th session), III, 344.

42. Wood, op. cit., 32-34.

"'Integration'," The New Statesman and Nation, XXXVIII (December 24, 1949), 746.

"The Frustration of Unification," The New Republic, CXXIII (December 25, 1950), 11-13.

43. Official Report of Debates Part I (4th session, II, 154.

nationalism is also a barrier to other forms of European union.

In light of the above, it can be readily seen that it was not Great Britain's interests alone, whatever they might be, which hindered European union. The British have, however, served as an international scapegoat, and have been accused of "obstructionism," "dragging their feet," playing the game of "balance-of-power," "insularity" and many other "Machiavellian designs."

Indeed until the peoples of Europe as a group feel the need for union, it is not likely that there will be a European union by mutual consent. Until Europeans succeed in cultivating the true European spirit, they are not justified in hurling the ancient taunt Perfide Albion at their English cousins across the Channel for preventing a union on which they themselves cannot agree. Once there is a true desire on the part of Europeans for union no British obstructionism will succeed in defeating its strong, unified purpose. Britain has been the scapegoat, but she was never the real villain at Strasbourg. All European countries represented were responsible for the failure of the Council of Europe and each nation must assume its share of the blame.

British Policy in the Council of Europe Impeded the Cause of European Union

The second conclusion which can be drawn from this study is that British policy in the Council of Europe has impeded the cause of European union. Despite party members' comments to the contrary, the Conservative Party did, in their opposition to the Labour Government, play politics in the Council of Europe. This opposition gave hope to Continental unionists that a Conservative victory at the polls would bring a

decided change in British policy toward the Council of Europe. The fact that historical precedent and underlying factors which determine British policy rendered this hope unrealistic does not negate the truth of this statement. To a great extent, this change in British policy in the Council was expected because of the important part which Winston Churchill had played in promoting the cause of European unity from 1946 through 1950. He was the prime mover, the prophet, the leader and the champion of this cause while out of office. He was the greatest critic of the Labour Government's dilatory tactics in the Committee of Ministers, and he had carried his Opposition from the House of Commons into the Assembly of the Council of Europe. When Fyfe's speech revealed this hope to be only an illusion, the cause of European union was dealt a severe blow.

Churchill had never explicitly advocated a European union in which Britain would be a participant. When he was specific about a United States of Europe, Churchill, as Fyfe pointed out in the Conservative statement of policy toward union, often spoke of "three pillars" or "concentric circles" of Western unity. The first included the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth of Nations and Empire, the second the United States and her associates and the third Western Europe.[44] At no time did Churchill's vision include Britain in a European federation. He was too much of an imperialist for that. Nevertheless, his opposition to every grudging step which the Labour Government took gave hope to continental unionists in the Assembly. In this he was supported by

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44. Official Report of Debates Part II (3d session), III, 513.

prominent Conservatives like Duncan Sandys and Harold Macmillan, who in turn were supported by the noted Liberal delegate, Lord Layton. "Punch drunk with rhetoric [and] blinded by cigar smoke," these Conservatives followed "the right hon. Member from Woodford . . . with constancy and faithfulness."[45] Despite Labour delegates' attempts, time and time again, to expose the Conservative position as fallacious in the light of Britain's dual position in the world, the Assembly, nursed by the equivocation and ambiguity of Conservative delegates, sheltered its illusions until the moment of truth when Fyfe's speech cast it into despair.

It would be impossible to say which dealt the cause of European unity the severest blow--Labour "obstructionism" or the Conservative "betrayal". There can be little doubt that the remascent cause of European union has been impeded by the British stand. For example, it is generally felt that, if the British had agreed to take part in the European Defense Community, French fears of German domination would have been placated, and France would have ratified the EDC Treaty.[46] If EDC had been ratified by the six countries who had signed the treaty, a Political Community would have been the next logical step. The British attitude was the determining factor in the French decision to reject the EDC Treaty.[47] The Political Community which would have had to be developed to control and administer the Army has therefore met the fate

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45. Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s, CDL (1948), 1348 (Quoting Leslie Hale).

46. Official Report of Debates Part I (3d session), II, 362.

47. Nicholas, op. cit., 178.

of other proposed communities which were to further European integration. There is the possibility, however, that despite the British attitude, the German problem may in itself have been enough to defeat EDC.

Perhaps now, since France better realizes the British position, additional progress toward union can be made. Neither France nor other European countries should again make the mistake of expecting more co-operation in place for union from a Conservative Government than from a Labour Government. Nor can any one expect great strides to be made toward European union until Europeans as a group decide that such a goal will offer the solution to a myriad of old and new problems.

The Assembly

There has been much talk of the failure of the Council of Europe. Despite what historians may say to the contrary, the Council of Europe has failed to achieve the purpose for which so many of its first delegates thought it was established. That was the federation of Europe. The debates in the 1949 and 1950 sessions rang with an earnestness of those who, with great expectations, stood on the threshold of a new era. Many felt that the threat of Communist imperialism was so great that only by unification could Europe save itself from the Red menace. This fear, plus the conviction held by many in these first two years of the Council's existence that the time was ripe for the realization of the old European dream, caused delegate after delegate to expound his belief in this great European dream. Indeed, as the debates in 1951 and 1952 revealed, union was still a dream. Continued debate showed the delegates at Strasbourg that diversity was the curse of Europe. The Assembly itself was made up of such diverse and divergent opinions

concerning the aims, form and methods of the proposed union that disillusionment and apathy were inescapable. From the complaints of many, it was evident that both mental attitudes infested the Assembly.

This is not to say that the entire Strasbourg experiment was a failure. Unification of Europe has not been achieved, nor is it true that much of a concrete, practical nature has evolved from the discussions of the Assembly. The Convention of Human Rights, for example, which was considered by some as the greatest contribution of the Council to Europeans, had, by the end of 1952, been ratified by only three Member countries.[48] The Schuman Plan, another example, grew up outside the aegis of the Council of Europe, although it is very unlikely that the Plan would have been conceived without the inspiration and support of the Council. Much will depend upon the administration of the Plan, and it will be years before its success or failure can be evaluated. However, as long as Britain, the largest producer and consumer of coal and steel, remains out of the Plan, it cannot be truly effective. Also, the fear that the six Schuman Plan countries would only further divide Europe is not completely unfounded. If nothing else there is the natural tendency of an organization, once created, to jealously guard its prerogatives and powers against all future reorganizational change. The European Defense Community succumbed to traditional French fears of Germany, and the fate of the European Political Community hangs somewhere between nimbus and nemesis. All these can be cited as examples of the

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48. Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom--all by the way, excepting France, the greatest respecters of individual liberties in Europe.
Official Report of Debates Part II (4th session), V, 600.

Council's failure. Paradoxically enough, they can also be cited as examples of its limited success. It is likely that none of them would, or could, have been even still-born, if it had not been for the Council of Europe.

The one great contribution of the Council of Europe is that it has, to a great extent, highlighted the complexities involved in any plan for European union. Along this line its service to coming generations cannot readily be evaluated. While achieving little toward a practical and workable union in Europe, it has achieved a great deal in the realm of highlighting and isolating a myriad of problems and complexities facing the proponents of union. Since the limitations of the Council are now known, much practical work within those limitations can perhaps be done to further the cause of union.

Those who so readily criticize the Assembly at Strasbourg for its dearth of achievement should remember that perhaps its greatest achievement is the miraculous fact of its existence. "The fact that the Council of Europe exists at all," wrote Maurice Edelman, "is in itself a positive achievement, and one which it would have been very difficult to conceive of in the nineteen-thirties."[49] Crane Brinton pointed out that "the earnest workers at Strasbourg have no power to get anything done. Yet it is by no means impossible that the historian will one day note the Council of Europe as the embryo of the United States of Europe."[50] Brinton also pointed out that reformers have been unable

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49. International Affairs, XXVII (January, 1951), 29.

50. Op. cit., 486.

to carry out much needed revisions in local government, or to effect an improvement of a system, for example, as inefficient as the government which results from the illogical division of our country into forty-eight states.[51] If these local and greatly desired reforms, of what constitutes a relatively simple problem compared to the intricacies and perplexities of the medley of the European mass of nation-states, are resisted and made impossible, then how much more difficult, if not impossible, is the projected union of European states. In such a perspective, it can honestly be said that the mere fact that the Council of Europe exists is its greatest achievement.

Mario Einaudi stated that the main goal of the movement for European unity has been to protect Western Europe from expanding Communistic imperialism, and he pointed out that emphasis upon the military and strategic causes for union could seriously prevent such union.[52] It is evident from the course of events in the Assembly that he was right. A European union based primarily upon strategic and defensive considerations is doomed to failure. To a great extent, the recent emphasis upon union received its main support from those who regarded a European union as Europe's last ditch defense against the encroaching Red menace. To some extent its failure can be attributed to the emphasis put upon the military aspects of European union. The defeat of EDC revealed the disunifying, rather than the unifying, force of military integration.

Britain cannot have security unless there is security in Western Europe; therefore the closest association and understanding between

51. Ibid., 487.
52. "Europe After Stalin," The Yale Review, XLIII (September, 1953), 29-31.

Britain and her continental neighbors is essential. As long as Europe is divided against itself, Britain must look elsewhere for her own, and Europe's, security.[53] Since her war-time alliance with the United States, she has founded that security upon her ties with the United States and the Commonwealth of Nations. She will continue, therefore, to look to the Atlantic Community and to the English-speaking peoples overseas for support and security. Her "associations" with Europe will of necessity be close, but she cannot afford to allow these "associations" to prevent her retaining complete freedom to play her important part in the rest of the world. Not being able to maintain a balance of power in Europe alone,[54] Great Britain must look to the United States and her Commonwealth to help in this important task, important not only to Britain's security, but important to the security of the Western world as well.

As Labour delegate Healey remarked:

> It is no good discussing the relations of the continental Community with Britain or the Scandinavian countries. Britain and Scandinavia are now either too weak or too distracted by overseas commitments to spare for Western Europe the power which is required to correct [sic] the balance, unless the United States is prepared to join them in this enterprise. Britain and Scandinavia cannot afford to commit themselves

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53. W. T. Wells, "The Future of Defence," The Fortnightly, CLXXIII (May, 1950), 306.

54. In 1948, R. H. Crossman, Labour MP, commented in the House of Commons: "In 1942 the European balance of power ceased to mean anything at all. We have seen, in this war, the transformation of a European balance of power to a world balance of power, the transformation of Europe from the subject of world politics to one of the objects of world politics. That is the fact upon which the case for Western union rests."
Hansard, H. C. Deb. 5s., CDXLVI (1948), 564.

> more deeply in continental Europe unless the United States and Canada are prepared to do likewise.[55]

This is a true evaluation of the British position, and any future policies in the Council of Europe will be largely determined by it. Regardless of the party in power, Britain's policy towards European union will be determined by overseas commitments and the degree of support and cooperation she receives from the United States. If union is desirable, and, if it is to be achieved, the United States' support must take a more concrete form than verbal encouragement from our leaders or written statements sponsoring such a union in various legislation passed by Congress.

What Europe needs is a unifying force. At the present time, such a force is not to be found in Europe; at least, not in that part of Free Europe referred to as Western Europe. It is not to be found in a Britain, anchored like a ship off the coast of Europe which seems at every moment about to lift anchor and set sail.[56] It is evident that the Council of Europe is not that unifying force. The Council failed because it chose an impossible task. Who knows that in the tomorrows to come the task may not be impossible; the end will be achieved; and the results will be those needed to bring happiness and brotherhood to millions of Europeans. Regardless of the failure, the goal is worth the struggle of countless generations. If "the theme of the century is world unity",[57] Europe may yet find the force necessary to achieve this

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55. Official Report of Debates Part II (4th session), III, 393.

56. Goormaghtigh, op. cit., 58.

57. Kenneth Lindsay, "Atlantic Unity: Time for Decision," The Fortnightly, CLXXVI (December, 1951), 790.

long-dreamed-of ideal. The Strasbourg experiment may yet find a solution; if not, it is to be hoped that other solutions can be found for the perplexing problems which harass this sorely battered continent.

It is a bit ironical that Strasbourg with the unfinished tower of its great Gothic cathedral should have become the site of the House of Europe, which to the present time still embodies the hope of one of Europe's oldest dreams. Perhaps both edifices symbolize the greatness of man's aspirations and dreams. Perhaps, too, the fact that they are both incomplete, even though in different ways, symbolizes the great gulf which separates the dream from reality. Indeed if the dream which inspired the House of Europe is to remain for all time unrealized, as until now the tower of the Strasbourg Cathedral has remained unfinished, then its existence will mark in the history of the European Union idea a point of departure from mere dreaming into the realm of action. It will represent a step forward; and in some sense the gulf between dream and reality will have been slightly, ever so slightly, bridged. Perhaps the Strasbourg experiment is but proof of "the inevitability of gradualness," or truer still it may be evidence of Robert Browning's insight into that which is most worthy and beautiful in man:

> Progress, man's distinctive mark alone,
> Not God's, and not the beasts': God is, they are,
> Man partly is, and wholly hopes to be.[58]

In these few lines, Browning suggests, as does the sub-title of this final section, that there is a force in man which drives him for-

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58. "A Death in the Desert," Augustine Birrel (ed.), The Complete Works of Robert Browning (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1920), 510-11.

ward towards a fuller realisation of his potentialities. Those potentialities might possibly be realized in a united world, of which a united Europe, even a union of divided Europe—that of Western Europe—would be the initial step. Perhaps, too, the very existence of the Council of Europe has started that Vis Inertiae which, once set in motion, will tend to move on in a straight line to some form of political union. Regardless, if this start towards European union is destined only to be recorded in history as a failure, it is none the less a start. The existence of the Council of Europe has set a force into motion. Perhaps if the Council can just maintain its existence, it will eventually serve to justify the great hopes and aspirations which brought it into being. As long as it exists, man has much to hope for. When it passes, if in time it does, from the European scene, with it will pass a part of the greatness and nobility of man's dream—indeed, of man himself.

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